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  • At Department's.suggestion I wi:thheld demarche this subject planned for December 3 but am now increasingly concerned over scant time remaining available to work out with GOP new arrange_ment covering period on and after January 1, 1964. Foreign Minister now at SC meeting
  • reply to Wilson: to Hanoi 187 (With strong Kosygin had no new information "he could not venture As in London he indicated and made it clear and expansion of the Vietnamese Thompson that the last offer overriding that conflict. caveat from
  • for meaningful programs. It is now anticipated that a joint GVN/U. S. policy on cadre will be developed at the Central Rural Reconstruction Council- Mission Council level; for this purpose a new proposal is being prepared at the staff level in USOM, USIS and MACV
  • be taken to encoura ge additional private inve strn.ent by industri a li ze d countries in Southea st Asia .. 5. A re\.riew of the pros and cons of an immediate increas e in U. S. assistance to Southeast Asia even befo r e the estab­ lishment of a new
  • elections in which the Communist Party did better than the Socialists . The result will be difficult negotiations before a new Government can be formed . Current East German act ivity, such as travel restrictions now being ilnposed, indicate that the East
  • hopes that we can include civic action pro jects in \ existing and future ·military and economic assistance programs wherever practicable and in guidance that will affect future planning. He realizes we will have to develop new procedures
  • under the Com­ munications Satellite Act of 1962 and the Communications Act of 1934, and recommending a broad new multi-pronged attack on the US communications problem. The President asked Pierson to obtain the views of the respon­ sible agencies
  • at Hiroshima, are readily available and it would require only a few years for a new nuclear power to weapon­ ize a bomb to fit. Moreover, missiles may in time become cheaper and more readily available: through the satellite programs or surface­ to-air missile
  • to be a confederatiop of sovereign states loosely grouped around Fran rej cts a ons: the "integration" of Europe into a new federal st te for sev~ral because he is opposed to what he feels would amount tot co comitant destruction both of the existing nation states
  • an arms control agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States. 9. How to reassure the US public and allies that deterrent posture is not impaired by the development Soviet and CHICOMstrategic capabilities. 10. antees Nlpahj the US of new How
  • and both have signfd~ So have Prime Ministers Holyoake of New Zealand, Krag of Demnark and Borton of Norway. •[ Mr. Kosygin, after lengthy and careful consideration, has decided not to sign on the ground that he doesn't agree with parts of the declaration
  • of this effort has been to open up the USSR increasingly to the outside world. The process is a continuing one and can be expected to receive constant new impulse, for example, from the unresolved problem of destalinization and over the long run from
  • the record I sugg~st that if you cone• r with the foregoing that you will desire to issue a new NS~1 or an amendment indefinitely postponing the request for a response to NS#-! 298. ti! u. Alexis Jo SECRET 8 1964 __BUNDY-SMITH -:itLE'!IAHJ;\iR _BATOR
  • to avoi d undermi ning the confidence which exists between the President and Ambassador Taylor. No great new decisions are expected to result. Under Secretary Ball Reviewed the problem of military assistance to Jordan. The Arab States are jointly tryi ng
  • ~ 7 , clS'.,8 ~ AILJ 87-/97 lift,,,_ I - 9 -'1" J 8'7-~o..r N, "' II duplicate /lo 1fiJ l e t cer-- ~ rp,fr 2;0- PM Holyoalrn from Pres. possible classified info #10 messag #:ti memo Jclms011 ,fill! 7,l.r ~ 8 'f✓ iq from PM of New Zealnad
  • ", Box 33] o~n Lt/l&/12 OS an9ram New Delhi A-9 70 c- ~ 4f~9f66 94 A'l8A'l9 G. .IORR68R &oReeten s 2 5~~88 05 memo Keeny to Rostow s 1 4/29/66 A Optn 'lbO/tSptt R,l'tC'11~ opU1 q/1'5/ll ijt;S oq-1&.1-e I\- i-7 ,fl,,. [Sanitized per
  • to test the Soviets 1 intentions by further conversation. If, however, the next round of conversation is fruitless, NASA should be requested to develop some specific action proposal that would represent a new initiative on our part. At the last meeting
  • By.....__->-.. 'An,A, Da.......__.........,P'I 7 Referring to recent discussions in New York, the ·secret·ary recalled that he had informed Gromyko that while there appeared to be agreement in principle on refraining from placing weapons . of mass destruction- in orbit
  • the recipient• apend their limited money on aecurlty need.I. But we weapona. We know lndt& ha• leptimate that arm• purebaaea will be kept at a bare minimum. would h4tJ>• Every new arm• deal that hit• the papel"a makea it harder for u• to help India build
  • Special Group (CI). 1'tf overall impression is that the intent of NSAM-341 ha~ tP.P. n only partially fulfilled and that whatever vitality the new system had at the outset is apparently on the decline. - 2 ­ Rather than allow the NSAM concept to die
  • be leaving the meeting at 1100, we should tum to the heart of the problem, the MLF. Mr. Bates said he would like to discuss problem. this it 1n tact it still is a He said he had Just attended 111eetingsof the NATOParliamentarians in New York
  • . The Government we ■tern Ea ■ t baa ■ ituatlon to the to and from Berlin and between the Federal a.rm.any muat to the of it• 1overmnent, of the SoYiet Government announced that new l•Yi•• will nterin1 3. Ea ■t and compllmat1 from recent action
  • interes t s ·in t he continent . 1. / ... - SECRE'f · - 2­ Maghrebian economic cooperation; it has caused new problems of internal stability in Morocco and Tunisia and new anxieties about the military strength of r adical Algeria; it has opened new
  • leaving New York, I •hould like to addr••• to Your Excellency hoapltality you accorded of America the friendly me durina my Yiait to the United Stat•• three month• ago .. My current •e••lon while rec&llln1 with gratitude myaelf vl•lt wa• 1n
  • that bas just about completed sweeping the world and will be breaching its own policy since World War I of not acquiring new territorial possessions if it seeks to make Micronesia .a United States territory. Second, of all eleven United Nations
  • be heavy is supported by SNIE 36-2-64 of 15 April 1964. Moreover, Israeli acquisition of surface-to-surface missiles is a matter of great concern to the U.S., because of the new arms spiral it would help stimulate in the area and the additional step toward
  • the cards we have had to play in this field. Secr etary Fowler indicated that he was seeing Mr. Schweitzer of the IMF and private bankers from New York i n the next coupl e of days, and we could begin laying any ground work necessary. The President then said
  • only 5% to 15% of the capability of this new machine. Therefore it seems to me our denial would be effective to forestall a significant contribution to French nuclear warhead and delivery capabilities. Accordingly, I would propose IBM not be authorized
  • response to the proposals for cooperation already made by President Kennedy and by you. (b) No new high-level US initiative is recommended until the Soviet Union . has had a fur-ther opportunity (possibly ·t hree months) to discharge its current obligations
  • of a mer.no that the Prea.iden.t would enjoy signing aad that you w·o uld enjoy receiving. Equally to the point, I think that it would give you the kind of man­ date you m.ay want for any new a.ad imaginative ways of meeting what may otherwise tura out
  • . In recent weeks I have asked those Departments of the Government with special competence in our continuing attack on hunger, ignorance and disease to bring their resources to bear in Vietnam. I have expressed my special interest in the progress of these new
  • , the new Thai troops are doing very well, the Koreans are e.>..1:ra­ ordinary, and the Australian units' morale is very high. Two problems which need attention: 1. The Communists are trying to win over the youth of South Vietnam. In Saigon, the youth
  • . Matters are complicated, in the short run, by a very high rate of natural increase of population. Ulti­ mately this will create larger markets and provide settlers to open up new areas, but in the early stages of industrial growth it means that a large
  • to be much less and perhaps to satisfy interests. At a later of death," and of the new force policy France's the military probably and military engage in lobbying, successors for a French and will full not have This feeling difficult need
  • a discussion Deliver our new strategy support civilians purge corrupt administration of negotiations to be provided a Presidential address strategy stated and force re~ in the NSAM. to Saigon with General it must broaden their and move
  • problemo refer anc:1 ~ -,C representa­ Dept in New York which to l, on ad & const! ute At conclusioa points to mutually meeting, respective govern- ments: lo Within 60 days US will enriched uranium necessary Further, US will give
  • themselves not to launch new na.tional nuclear programs. Three alternative forms which that force might take are set forth below, beginning with assignment and progressing toward joint ownership of delivery _s ystems and warheads. . 1) · 1
  • 12958 3.4lbll11>25Yrs 1. T he nuclear test site in Communist China can be co-mp1etea within t wo to 2. The Soviets are undertaking a vigorous ICBM program. been held of a new weapon, the SS - 10 , Many tests have (CJ EO 12958 3AlbH1J>25Yrs
  • the present period. The President reviewed thr ee years of involvem e nt in the Vietnam problem, expressing doubt chat an unusually large amount of tim e w;i.s spent consider ing new proposals or changes in policy. Our strategy has been the same for three
  • a month. Mr. Mar ks : Urged ( a ) a conference of world intellectuals to stress the economic cos t s and secur i t y liabilities of nucl ea r weapons; (b) using the 20 th anni versary of the Baruch pro p osa l s as th e occasion for a bold new U.S . initia