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  • errectl\·.?·· defen;;e c.,tabhsh­ ment ever :itna\\"~ ~> m·,:1: Til'.? try_ !ca­ gotl::'.tcd nnd concluded -.nth the Inter·national Atomic Ener;y Aiiency" e.nd ture o! Uu:i dcc1s10•,m.,kmg tccl 1s 3 n that such D()~otiaUons commence within examination or e
  • are made to obtain participants with detailed and expert knowledge of the subject to be examined. c. JWGA's politico-military games are generally conducted on an inter-agency basis with participants from the principal organizations involved in national
  • with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION GSA FORM 7122 iREV. 5-82) CONFI DEN'fIAL DECLASSIFIED-~~-~- _::~ ,.~ w. w.. Rostow E.O. 12356. Sec. 3.4 _NY 2 7 - /lo;;J.. By ~ • NARA. Date 11-S"- g7 November 19, 1964
  • information to foreign governments. He understood that a group in Defense was also engaged in such a re-examination. Mr. Parrott noted that one State proposal would appear to put the USIB in the position of inspector general, charging it with preparing damage
  • -proliferation in coordinated for military a pro• defense action in the contingencies. This memorandum examines a number of general iesues nuclear terms, form of the undertaking, and/or by the two major nuclear or by sny single or formal agreement
  • in preparing for the exercise. Efforts are made to obtain participants with detailed and expert knowledge of the subject to be examined. c. JWGA's politico-military games are generally conducted on an interagency basis with participants from the principal
  • coatrilMator lo tbe We•n ..._ of Ua.e armr ..,x1 •. U:CUT DECLASSIFIED E.O 1,:,,::n, Sec. 3.4 Ei'.4.a,J~. NARA, D3to~-/~ .. - .,, ~-OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department ~ATE, OCOWCI . ~~w ~ of ·state I . • ' '\ 'SECRET '\ 53 1 °' f I~ ,..,, DAC
  • ) --- - - - - --- -- Further Thoughts on FOBS lo Confidence. In the strategic business "high" confidence usually means better than 97%. On this basis 90% is not high. Furthermore, this is a prediction not a fact. In September, DOD was talking about only 80'3/o confidence
  • Arrangementlooooooooooooooo••··········· 29 39 JOINT COMMITTEEON ATOMIC ENERGY TOP SECRET­ oocuMENrNO... ~_e,..,.O __ ~I....__________ 11.L~ TABLE OF CONTENTS lo INTRODUCTION Ao Purpoae al Inapectlon lo General o "o o o o o o. o "o o o o o o o ,, o o o o o o o o o
  • · both the political and military authorities of our major NATO allies. Two alternative approaches should be considered: one which assumes the creation of a "NATO Nuclear Force" and one which does not. Among the possibilities examined should
  • . i' I I' I t May we have a meeting with you? Respectfully yours, I. Dean Rusk r. . 1· . t . t. : ~ .' 1•1 ! 1 '· "1' The President, The White House. '>I I I • I . • l I., ,; I ,. I I· .,. ' · - "" -lo 1
  • - . THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON TO l4J lo l,.u.- ~ eo,f_~ £,.J;- -v> ~$ IJ . /7', ~ JOA·/~ /J u .. _1/--/lo/'1; ,,:'1,5_~· I • THE WHITE WASHINGTON HOUSE FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY MU I-68 SCHEDULE MON TUES WED THURS FRI 26 APRIL Briefing
  • to day i.Qple:JOnta~ioD G/PM:OOrwicksfeaa 1n tho on.._oi.nq ~ aetiona ..... •- iii&fl u iiS T: ...... 11111_ .. .,r'IIG'l•ttl!lO •-Nr .. ,... SiiaMil• DF.a.ASSIFIED - • ~J-D?o'?-~ ll,:C.1>. NARA,Date~ 11 lneJDO .:.0:::1:r.J~ ~;;.;.c
  • . to protect accordance the atomic information released with the 1964 Agreement and its Recipients will be required under this determination in supporting Annexes. When se;,o.ratcd trom inclosures hand lo this documont as EXCLU~ED ?HO!! l\!JT0:4/\TIC
  • believe that this change reflects a serious examination during the past few weeks of alternatives open to the GOI and particularly since Dharma Vira' s previous remarks on the subject (see A-805, March 4, 1966). He added that the High Commission believes
  • , was charged with examining planning assu~ptions and policies for the several stpckpiles, with particular attention to: "(1) The major m.ilitary and economic assumptions used in ·c al- culating existing conventional war stockpile objectives. "(2
  • examined. rent for of current out of which the American departs, Continuation for granted. with talking this intellectual of the present The political and learning about nuclear strategy proficiency will will opponents are at best
  • . iEOMiil lo Jovemb r 2, 1965 Dear Hae, Control Aa to our telephone temporary proareas report (from tract fora puter thia. Data conversation onlyt yesterday, this i• a so .. how or other our contract.people 1ot inatructiona Co111Mrce?) to make
  • 1965 with United States officials from Bonn, Paris, London, together with players from White House, Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, United States Informa­ tion Agency, and the Department of Defense. The game is intended to examine
  • Two alternative approaches should be considered: one which assumes the creation of a "NATO Nuclear Force" and one which does not. f f. I ~ Among the possibilities examined should be the creation of a permanent body of restricted membership
  • external aid and levels of Indian military expenditure. -- We are seeking to negotiate arms control proposals, including a non-proliferation agreement, and we are examining new proposals, notably a threshold test ban. -- We are exploring assurances
  • of BETA I & II-67 was to examine some of the major issues, problems and questions associated with strategic weapons deployment; with particular emphasis on anti-ballistic missiles. In addition to this report, film summary of BETA I & II-67 813@IU!lT
  • ). The advantages of such an approach, largely psychological, are matters a£ judgm.ent. The disadvantages must be examined in the light of specifics~ These are some of the suggestions: diminished {a) Separation of nuclear visibility of the former;. from non
  • DECISIONSCONCERNING ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS Introduction This paper examines to advance or inhibit The study also nuclear a balance of incentives countries weapons. and sanctions of continued However, no attempt and pressures of nucle~r incentives
  • it is in the U.S. interest to go in meeting Indian security concerns, what form such action might take, and what the optimum timing might be. -- Whether there are other approaches problem whtch need to be pursued. to the B. Basic Considerations 1. In examining
  • to Bonn had asserted that the United States .- SECRE'r - NOFURN B-II-1 B-II-1 .J 3 D or (Blue) (Red) Page 1 of 8 Pages _S_EC_R_lE':P __ ._!_fO_F'_O_R_N --.. had no choice but to "engage in basic re-examination of US policy toward Germany