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  • Date > 1965-07-xx (remove)

20 results

  • had not aided Hanoi. In general, the Viet Cong line is to play down the attacks. There was no indication that the attacks had any appreciable effect on VC supplies or reinforcements. The deployment and expansion of U.S. combat forces produced
  • ------ -------------------------------------14- p— -----06 lY tfis^ ....tf.2-7a- e g — -K----- - o G c ro te - ■4^20 Iruni Saigon- -06/-1-7/65- " # 5 ia -e ^ l€ — -s-taterAr^ -•2^ 2 S L 2 2 -fe « -S a ± f0 n : (• du pli cat es t e>-pr e aid e n .t-from Geo;--Bal-liB^Ta-rerport- s t
  • to continue our diplomatic efforts to obtain a peaceful aettleme nt, and emphasized our intent to uee 11 care and restraint'~ to insure that the war dld not expand. The message also acknowledged AuatraUa•e present aid to the GVN and aeked that 11 most earnest
  • against overoptimism and referred to Canada's public pledge of last September of $500, 000 v/hich has not yet been drav/n because of failure to agree on projects. Cals (Netherlands) said tliat v/Mle military aid v/as impossible he would see what else could
  • AGENCIES (S TA TE , AID, DOD, USIA AND CIA) CAN FIND WORKING IN THE PROVINCES SEVEN DAYS A WEEK AT PREC ISELY THE TASKS DESCRIBED IN PARA 6 . I S I T PROPOSED TO W ITH­ DRAW THESE PEOPLEAND REPLACE THEM BY ARMY C IV IL A FFA lRYFTYPES OPERATING
  • EUR P . USIA NSCINR CIA WSA DOD NIC AID . • , ■ R 1117 10Z ZPA------- ^ : ' ' FH A M EBA SSYxSA lG O fy ' -----^ TO R U E H C R /SEC SrA TE WASHDc \ U 0 ) INFO RUM.HQ/CINCPAC 66 sta te V. . 1921725. grnc 'i r• s ' *• \r : ■: . ' ' V
  • in Saigon, and have chosen the pick of our armed forces for service in South Vietnam, often on a voluntary basis. Nor have we thought for one minute that the effort was military alone. Our Embassy and our economic aid mission have been staffed by the wisest
  • a t e GMC • . . BT , „ ■ ^ £ - E - g R E T - APRIL 2 6 ' DECLASSIFIED K ! K ’20 C ggr INR NSA AID ii RMR --- 7“7 r F ^ Pa s s u s i a , d o d , j c s DEPTELS 2 4 1 7 , . NARS, D a t e _ i j ^ i L - £ • 2413 FOLLOWING I S COilPLETE TEXT GVN
  • E WEAKNESS OUR B A SI C P O S I T I O N I N SV N . 2. SOV M I L I T A R Y AID PROGRAM I N DRV I S PROBABLY D E F E N S I V E IN NATURE and SOVS WOULD W I S H TO K E EP I T T H A T WAY. HOWEVER, I F a t t a c k s on DRV BECOME G E N E R A L , P A R T
  • n t day w ith o . NAES, Date th a n k s t h a t rny v i s i t g o v e riim a n t G en eral sends v e r y m uch t o arg u m en t -n'ic. th a t le a d e r? ^in s w e ll as r^an n :rari„r';-.s.^r. aid f ro m i V F n it e H o u s e
  • Koreans c a re fu lly avoided extending t h e ir commitment beyond the previously announced in te n tio n to respond w ith aid and volunteers ’’when requested. USSR -6, Soviet commentary thus fa r has been rela~ tiv e ly sparse and confined to Pravda e d