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  • preferable to attempting to handle it by cable. We have to go over with him. carefully just how he would handle it with Ky, and we have to bring him into all our reasoning. ·b. Lodge's Consultation with GVN. This will certainly encounter some initial
  • BE UNTIL HE CSULDDISCUSS MATTERSFURTHERWITHPRESIDENTQ! POINTEDOUT Yi~E ELEMENTIN SITUATIONANDSAID Y WOULD BE GLADTO DISCUSS ~-~~TE~ WITHPRESIDENTCHIANGAT ANYTIME OR SHENCOULDPASS 0N KY VIEWSON THE SERIOUSNESSOF A BREAK. PAGE FIVE ! EMPHASIZED
  • have hailed e _a ch change in government in South Viet-Nam as a "good change;" each new leader as better than his predecessor. Pearson says McNamara's statement that the Ky-Buddhist rivalry is healthy was "naive and riduculous and an example
  • -Nam. In 1965, 1966, and 1967 Prime Minister Ky took risky steps to get rid of the most highly-placed of the corrupt officials. had no way of reaching the little ones. He obviously He went at it so hard that once it almost overthrew the Government
  • . On the political front, Ho Chi Minh and his advisors are faced with a more ambiguous situation. One hard fact confronting Hanoi, however, is the surprising aurability of the Ky government despite repeated crises. If the NVN regime has been counting on a. state
  • ! world we want to llvo _, while helping to forestall tho kind 0£ r ky and painfully expensive crisis epitomized by Vietnam. 4. It - is nation wauta to conduct a positive and dynamic foroign policy of tho sort this President thinks it does, he must
  • Prime Minister Ky, who is very enthusiastic about the dramatic possibilities of Rusk's proposals. The first batch (six) of college students sent to Vietnam for the summer und e r State / AID a uspices has returned to this country. They turn out to b e
  • ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 1429 (6-85) NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL _;.-- F frh ~~~ ~M. - ivt-~ ~ ,.J- LI- ~ IL.?- . ~--L ~ 7)}1 ? - ~ . · S DEPARTMENT OF STATE PECIAJ, Ass1sTANT A L. To THE S ECRET A KY j-A ..- -~---£. ~~y ff._ ~ ef~"' ~ I~ p µ
  • , would seem to indicate the desire of great numbers of the Soµth Vietnamese people to bring an end to the fighting. In fact, during the campaign, all candidates voiced publicly their support for a peace offensive. Ky may ! I i J . ·I The North
  • PRESEIT IF SAIGON _IS-TO BE ,PRESENT, i i .\ . jI -~- .. .,. 1 ~~ -., . .. ·•l . f .: AND I AM.SlffiE THAT THE GVN WILL INSIST ON THIS. A FURTHER ESSENTIAL WOULD BE PRIVATE CONSULT.ATION BY US WITH THIEU, KY AND DO BZFORE THE VATICAN PROPOSAL
  • in-fighting. about the S. His greatest concern is Saigon politics. He fears that Thieu may overplay his hand against Ky, Thang, Vien, and the young Turks. Specifically, he fears Thieu may judge that Bunker could do more to bail him out of political trouble
  • secret SC No. 01253/68 ~1:~ '/-;;;,.g. g.3 ~ . RESTRICTION ..._ 'J-1r-ky ~ 2 p 1 p Jl/~J-c..&S ~. 03/20/68 A NLJ/eA (_'l1-{ (g~' 03/28/68 A Nl.~-81-C,3 J t I I 1 .l FILE LOCATION National Security March 31st Speech, File, vol. NSC
  • ~S:WfitHAT.:J~~If'l~(MlN_ISTER :rtoc··.·W ABt·s·.r '·1,THINGS'.-JilOVIOO·,?HO-WEV~R!:.~~VIC~~PR£SIDENt·,·KY-rr· THE:;, lNET.'-HE~_EJPEctS~ 11\!.to.-sERVE.'.~IN:-~.OFFl,CE-.. FOR:Fo t.. 1 :·::.~:>~--:; -.~:\,~>f:·t_:~
  • ~S:WfitHAT.:J~~If'l~(MlN_ISTER :rtoc··.·W ABt·s·.r '·1,THINGS'.-JilOVIOO·,?HO-WEV~R!:.~~VIC~~PR£SIDENt·,·KY-rr· THE:;, lNET.'-HE~_EJPEctS~ 11\!.to.-sERVE.'.~IN:-~.OFFl,CE-.. FOR:Fo t.. 1 :·::.~:>~--:; -.~:\,~>f:·t_:~
  • announcem ent i s made, t h e y a r e t o c h e ck back t o s e e i f th e y w i l l be r e c a l l e d . (CDR ALLISON) DDO (Gen Wisman) in s ti* u c te d EA t o m a in ta in an open KY-9 l i n e t o Pac DO. (CDR ALLISON)(A) Pac D esk t o Pac DO. R e fe r e
  • originally advanced by Prime Minister Ky. The Government has stated publicly its support for the planned election. It has promulgated election laws, ancl-'procedures under the laws are being carried out. 2. Question: Is the Government of Viet-Nam trying
  • ' the consignee:; to h!C."ini -their trac..k.s down to the ships to move goods away expeditiously -- a .::i.d failure ~ ao this had been a major problem. d) Finally, Prime Minister Ky, after many talk sessio:is with u .s Ma.4~ the decision in late December to pu