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  • Vietnam. 9. There is no reason why we cannot insist that the North Vietnamese be specific as to what they will do. In the negotiations involving Soviet miss il e s in Cuba, the Korean Armistice negotiations, and even in the Berlin crisis , TOP SEGRET
  • peaceful reunification of Germany. b. Lippmann suggests 25-year time limit .. Pending reunification, Soviets and West reaffirm freedom of Berlin and We stern presence and access. c. Pending reunification, Soviets, Western Powers, and all Ger.m
  • cal problems but also "to strengthen existing 7Latin Am.ericariT bonds with the U.S. and to contain the threat of conununism.'r West Berlin ' s independent Der Taggesspiegal, which ran an AP story with two-column photographs, suggested in its headline
  • Berlin -, ~~:DY-SMITH ,.~ANDER , TOR G SP L CAP EUR E p US It~ NSC INR CIA NSA OSD ARMY NAV 1 AIR NIC SCA ORM CA£ CCM FAA RMR DATE: 3 Priority, 2 Priori\y~ Prio~ity , 2 Priority I\ I•· E T .AL tdi' J0liN8O:-I .1 z1 vfil KEENY KLE1N l
  • brought danger to the world. American conventional disarmament and apparent American disengagement brought the challenge of 1948 in Berlin and 1950 in Korea. American overcommitment to a single form of defense in the 1950 's brought the challenge
  • Marshal Vershinin to visit the US. For a number of reasons including the Berlin crisis this visit has not taken place. Visits by Soviet military leaders to the US are one effective method of reducing the possibility of the Soviets underestimating
  • parts of the world, the effect would also be very serious, even to the extent of affecting the morale in Berlin. Senator Dirksen asked Director McCone what the reaction of the Ch inese Communists would be . Mr. McCone said we did not know as yet, but he
  • government's attitude in the crises of Cuba and Berlin has proved her a loyal and faithful ally .... " and he charged the allied governments to adopt a joint strategic concept pledging that such a scheme would find his country 1 s atomic force coordinated
  • be a relatively Japan's Japan our willingness in defense Berlin, most Japanese, at least own security. There is, over the US deterrent to use it of its and Southeast in the absence however, SSSRITtNOEQRN LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~ to create allies
  • scene. From the day in 1916 when he took up a post as Attache in the American Embassy ~t("~~~~~~- in Berlin, to the leadership of negotiations to expand and liberalize world trade....which he was exercising to the day of his death.- he participated
  • weapons is deterred. How ­ ever, the nuclear situation does not dete r other uses of lnilitary force, such as halting convoys on the Berlin autobahn. Neither side now has a deployed anti - ballistic missile system. It would cost $15 billi on to g ive 3 0
  • no doubt utter threats against the Turks , it would not engage its own forces in any Cyprus crisis. We: cannot, however, ignore the possibility that Moscow might see~ to exploit this crisiu of NATO through moves elsewhere in the world, i . e.: Cuba, Berlin
  • if he could break President Kennedy on Berlin. I do not see the Soviets in an ultimatum mood on either Viet Nam or the Middle East at the moment. There is always, of course , the chance. But if the chance exists it is _J)ecause the Soviet Government
  • -;.'essive pressures and thrusts i::cc~:i Berlin to Ko1--ea.1 • trom tr.10 Cai•ibbea_~ to Viet-Nam.~ L11 short, we are involved in Viet-Nam.'because we know from p~iruul m:pe:dence that tho mlnlmum condition for order on ow.· pl:met ls that :J.ggrcsslo11
  • is PM'6~ 89 5 USBER BERLIN .,, .· SS r ior Chance l l or Erhar d's de pa rture from Washington June 13, Secretary G p s . ' handed h im :foll4wing message from President: USIA NSC .~ QTE Dear Mr . Chance llor : As you leave Wa shi ngton, I
  • Agency: DATE RES TRICTIO N White House, for FAA concurrence. #16 t1ern6 ll /29/63 #7fJ Memo 11/29/63 #60 Memo Bundy t o the President re J . Bu rke Knapp e~:qges witb b&t-ween a nan~aggres5io~ Berlin - Germ an¥ problem p~ct 1 p A c 12/ 7/63
  • of inspection which underlies the American proposal on "open access" when the negotiations resume in New York. --SECltE'f /NOFORN ' -6-ECR.S f"/NOFORN - 5 - Oh Berlin we had reports indicating th at the East Germans had been deliberately trying to pressure
  • mentioned the recent GDR interference with the travel of West German Citizens over the autobahns to Berlin. Kuznetsov quickly said this was an entirely different ques~ion and had nothing to do with the NPT. Mr. Bohlen said he had raised the matter only
  • in the way, among which are the following: 1. Can we ftnd some way to da-fuae the India-Pakistan conflict? (Although I do not think we can aolve thia la ■ue ln the near future any more than we can solve• the Berlin laaue in Europe or the Israeli issue
  • retaliate or suspending certain against where But this does not mean that the Soviets would not react 20. issues Berlin, the United States. international criticis~ by freezing negotiations in order to dem~nstrate They would certainly
  • Soviet reactions likewise Beyond inflamed emotions, over, founded in scarred lies the perception memories. that Berlin, in East Germaey are unresolved unrest violence whether cold~ can grow, especial~ business of threat Should control
  • in September that the Soviet Union might be in a better position to press Hanoi to negotiate if the US would- extend greater recognition of the German Democratic Republic for example allowing the DRGto control the Berlin access routes. and stated S~ 7