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  • to a truce in Quang Tri, th~ DMZ, in at least part of North Vietnam at this time. \ The latest example of their • aggressive intentions is the overrunning today of the far post at Ban Houei Sane on Highway 9· in Laos west of Khe Sanh. By his accelerated
  • O STS (Additional addresses^) iJ A A P IE R C E ARROW In lie u of not yet available detailed wrap-up of P IE R C E ARROW re ly . operation, posts shouldKai§r on following ite m s contained w ire le ss file »» * '■* •., fo r inform ation
  • 9 / 10. But if this timing does not suit, then I think we should aim at a post-Moscow exchange, in which case I could come over, say, on July 15. Any of these dates would satisfactorily avoid any clash with De Gaulle's Soviet trip (June ZO - July Z
  • armed forces and our Embassy, these reporters can move .freely over the face of that tormented country, holding a magnifying glass to every wart and wrinkle. For South Viet-Nam, Mr. Speaker, is indeed what Ward Just of the Washington Post called
  • . Although Quat has told me that no decisions have been taken, the press and our informants have it that the Council confirmed General "Little" Minh as Commander-in-Chief (he holds this post now on an "Acting" basis), selected General Huynh Van Cao as Chief
  • was passed after Selma. In each case, the administration moved promptly; the President's post-Selma speech to a joint session of the Congress was one of the finest moments in American political·history. -- The present national mood of shock and sorrow
  • where the subject of post-Wo~ld War II peace treaties was being discussed.) Senator Fulbright's main point, however, was not o~e of precedent but rather the following. He asserted t:.at if the North Vietnamese prove to be unyielding and i~ ef=ect adopt
  • of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. He has fulfilled these sensitive posts with the highest distinction. He has been especially useful in insuring that the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were known and understood in the White House. He performed with great
  • . Informally this point is being made whenever the opportunity arises in talks with both official and non-official South Africans here and at our posts in South Africa. Consideration of additional measures · such as higher level approaches will be reser'Ved
  • of post-visit e~pboria, and we need to put a.cross tne message that the next move is theirs and that performance is, the k.ey to our doing 1.--ilore. (I' rn workin.s with State / AID on. this. ). 3. Now that both Ayu.b and Oandbi visits are behind us, w
  • theater in World War II — it was in our deepest national interest to provide that help. Three events in the immediate post-war period set the stage for the type of problems we have been wrestling with in Asia, in a steady ssd COPY LBJ LIBRARY -3and
  • ) TO WHICH GVN HAS D IR EC T ACCESS, E IT H E R THROUGH OG LIA IS O N OFFICER POSTED IN SAIGON, GVN LIA ISO N O FFICER ATTACHED TO OG HQ, OR D IR EC T COMMUNICATIONS L IN K W ITH OG. B E LrE V E WE MUST RECOGNIZE TH A T OG WHICH ANSWERS ABOVE D ESC RIPTIO N W
  • in the first of immense days of challenge and promise. You come to us from a great mankind region where two-thirds of live. You come to us from a nation whose cultural heritage we deeply admire. And you come to us at the end of two post-war during
  • and responsive notices from the Times and the Post,, and also from other less doctrinaire observers of the Latin American scene. ~. ~. McG. B. m r~ , ·:;k...,. . ...... "' :':!. _ ... ~~ y.'- """ T H E WHIT E HOUS E WAS HI NGT ON September 18, 1964