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  • in allied troop co~mitrnents at this time would have un unfortunate psychological e.fiect. There would also be adverse reaction frorn members of U.S. Cong~•er,s1 as Emba.scy 1s undoubtedly aware :from reports of ald hearings (Passman SubCommittee
  • of Panama City said that the United States is "desperately looking for ways to close the breach that is appearing in its inter-American relations." President Orlich of Costa Rica told Ambassador Telles that this "timely expression of friendly feeling
  • TO HIM ALL ALONG THE WAY,GAVINCONSISTENTLY HELD THE POSITION THAT HE HAD NO STATEMEMTS TO MAKE UNTIL HE HAD TIME TO THINKABOUTWHAT· HE HADSEENAND HEARD. FRA[ 1KLY, HE WASVERY GOODIN AVOIDING PUBLIC STATE~~-' TS. HE DID, HOv!EVER, DINE WITHDEANBRELIS, PE1
  • TO HIM ALL ALONG THE WAY,GAVINCONSISTENTLY HELD THE POSITION THAT HE HAD NO STATEMEMTS TO MAKE UNTIL HE HAD TIME TO THINKABOUTWHAT· HE HADSEENAND HEARD. FRA[ 1KLY, HE WASVERY GOODIN AVOIDING PUBLIC STATE~~-' TS. HE DID, HOv!EVER, DINE WITHDEANBRELIS, PE1
  • to the US. At various times in the past several years France has taken a relatively active role regarding Vietnam, sometimes in public and sometimes in private. France sent high-level emissaries to Peking and Hanoi to sound out the leaders; has acted
  • producing two or three times more rice than in any previous year. Since agriculture accounts for nearly 5 0% of India's GNP, a break­ through on this order would have a dramatic effect on the Indian economy. As production increases purchasing power
  • a letter ~f designation. The designation has these antecedents: From the time he took the OAS-CIAP job, Sol Linowitz has been pressing to establish an OAS Mission comparable to Goldberg's UN Mission. ARA has resisted -- as it had done with effqrts of some
  • talked enough," he said. j l r .j j I Tcherniakov referred to the Gromyko-Goldberg agreement between the two governments at lea:st four times, and concluded, referring back to the conversation .about Vietnam, that if we succeeded in acting together
  • visit behind us, it is time to begin shoring up the Pakistan side of our affairs in the subcontinent. A first step is to tell Ayub what you said to Mrs. Gandhi about Indo-Pak relations and Kashmir, since we promised to keep him informed. Kashmir is still
  • there is a greater linking of the idea of talking than there has been at any time since I started following North Vietnamese matters in the autumn of 1963. (Since that time, I have talked with all of the Indians, Canadians, and Poles about their visits to Hanoi
  • AGENCY OR &'IT COm>ONENT. OFFICIAL JUDGMENT BY . IT REPRESENTS THE OBSERVATIONS A.~D INTERP:.U:TATIONS OF A STAFF OFFICER BASED ON INFORltATION ' AVAILABLE TO HIM AT THE TIME OF PREP!JtATION. ~U~~A.RY. THOUGH "GENERAL,.. IN REGARD TO ATTACKS
  • .em. oil I$ cut off$ and oven in normttl times. tlta la:r.gest single supplier of the ttS • 12-~6 million long tone of lroa ore aninutlly ~hlc h go to 6 Gteal = ills thyoughoat the US. and. $t.6, billion 1A ann.uQl trade ($198 million la oxpods o.nd
  • Administrator Gaud requests your approval to pledge a program loan of µp to $65 million for CY 1967 at the Turkey Consortium meeting, now scheduled for Janunry 27. Gaud also requests your approval to negotiate this loan, probably some time in February
  • understand that you will spend some time studying how we work to rehabilitate the 4isabled and handicapped here in America. -- We will be most grateful for any comments or suggestions you may have after you have seen our rehabilitation centers and have
  • at the release of tbe Am.ericaD aoldiera in time to apelld Chriatmaa with their familiea and your tbank9 for tbe eood treatment of the mea, illcludillg excellent medical care accorded die wounded. man. I recommend tb&t yoll aip the letter. ·w. W. Attachments
  • . State 110781 (not sent Tokyo) authorized US representative to sign unacceptable North Korean docur."lent at time of release of Pueblo ts .. above signature, crew after first writing iP:1 /any one of several specified inscriptions . . Variaut
  • .-ASK GENERAL · THIEU . TO · AGREE::· TO'· WITHDRAW ·FROM-· THE·- PRESIDENTIAL . RACE' •.. THANG -SAV : THIEU AND -.THE ' LAtTm -- REFUSED< ·-· SIMPLY- ro _WITHDRAW ':· ANO': SAID· HE: WOULD · MAKE HIS · FINALi~'DECISION . . . .AT SOME .TIME. CLOSER
  • : FOUR WORDS) I WAS ABLE TO TELL HIM HOWMANY PEOPLE THERE WERE IN THE CREW Ai'JD THE FACT £1LJ,TWE NEEDED MEDICAL ATTENTION. THEY COMPLETELY CHOSE TO IGNORE THE REQUEST WE HAD FOR MEDICAL ATI'ENTION. AT THIS TIME HODGESWAS STILL BARELY ALIVE AND WE
  • ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified
  • of our effort in the south. (This last sounds like an effort to have it both ways.) 2. I continue to be a strong believer in a December pause, and of course the time is getting shorter every minute. Rusk and McNamara and I plan to review this matter
  • CONVERSATION I MENTIONED THAT AGREEMENT COtJTINIJED TO BE HELD UP ON ~ATTERS I HM) ~ffNTIONED EARLIER BUT THAT THESE MIGHT BE RESOLVED AT ANY TIME AND IF so -I"WOULD TAKE THE . LIBERTY OF MAKING DIRECT CO~TACT WITH THE PRIM~ MINISTER IF THERE SHOULD
  • of our meeting with you last week. Jack Valenti has given us time at 11 :30 on Friday for a meeting with you, and your night reading for tomorrow will have the papers for Friday's discussion. Mean­ while 1 I have one further thought that you may wish
  • the Pentagon; that is, all the members of the JCS and the service Secretaries, as well as Clifford and Nitze; -- the Strategic Rese rve call-up (par a. 3) would be announced at the same time as the call-up to support the thirty thousand deployment, but it would
  • or 1976 or any other time. It is because of the victories of our compatriots in the South, '' their defeat of two American dry season offensives and the resistance of the North to 2 1/ 2 years of air attacks that we are getting more support and assistance
  • and cool-headed set ·of proposals for this meeting. We can also fend off Soviet propaganda against the MLF as long as we are smart about it. It is true that it would be good to have more time, but this kind of last-minute Soviet acceptance is a standard
  • of your invitation and authorize start of negotiations on FY 1967 assistance, with the _o bjective of completion at a time which would permit signing of loan agreement during the Frei visit. I have reviewed the negotiating instructions on our assistance
  • into another unmanageable idea like the MLF after I get out of here. (I myself spent a lot of time backing the MLF, but once burned, twice shy.) McG. B. THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON Friday, January 28, 1966, 9 A. M. MR. PRESIDENT: Another Wise Man bites
  • : progress is being made. don•t strain. publicly to convince people Douglas Dillon: -- spend time not on how we got into Viet Nam, but on po_sition we're in and real choices we face; -- clarify what we are doiug on the ground and in bombing; D ~~!:-1!:.0
  • : progress is being made. don•t strain. publicly to convince people Douglas Dillon: -- spend time not on how we got into Viet Nam, but on po_sition we're in and real choices we face; -- clarify what we are doiug on the ground and in bombing; D ~~!:-1!:.0
  • , lnjurie• and material damage. I am also prof011Ddly arateful for the very important and timely help received from the United State• through your active Embaaey, which has contributed ao much to alleviating the depr•••ing aituatlon in the affected region
  • are allowing the almost wholly goverr...rnent-controlled media to feed the growing anti-US and pro-Chicom sen.thnent in Pakistan. Oux Embassy and USIA report' US prestige is at an all-time low. The risk here is that Ayub may paint himself into a corner
  • MEMORANDUM Participants: Z3, 1967 OF CONVERSATION Abba Eban, Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Avraham Harman, Ambassador of Israel Ephraim Evron, Minister of Israel W. W. Rostow Harold H. Saunders Time: 11 a. m., October Z3,· 1967, in Mr. Rostow 1
  • am, and I think it ls simpler if he simply comes at Max Taylor's invitation ln tho same plane. Moreover, the quick departure which I suggest hardly gives time to get him out to the area ln any other way and, as I say. I am sure that there la no point
  • weapons h~ve spread. Today, for the first time, we have within our grasp a way to arrest this dangerous development. Since 1945, five nations have come into possession of this dread c apabi lity. . We believe now •• as we did then•• that even one
  • , "butchered" it. "Ii' . ._ .... .,.. ' ~ ~ . - i ,. Nonetheless NEWSWEEK apparently picked up the q\lote used by Breslin. TIME intended to use it but, after checking with me, abandoned it. What I told Breslin -- again confirmed by Pierpont -- was simply
  • succeed. This conviction will not be created unless and until they come to the conclusion that the US is prepared to remain in. Vietnam for whatever period of time is necessary to assure the independent choice of the South Vietnamese people. The enemy
  • mar alM attead. No fermal r ... rb are eapecle4 after ,- recelYe tile 111eUl. Yo. llan approwed a&atemell& wblcll will " 1..... ~ the Pi'••• Office at tbe time of tlae ceremo-, (Ta• B). YCMI mlpt waat te to.cb oa oae or two Qftlle poiat• la tat
  • the Russians before taking it up with the Germans. Before making up your mind, you will wish to hear his argument in detail, as well as get the views of Rusk and McNamara. . The heart of the problem is timing. In terms of Alliance politics, it would be best
  • unions are taking steps to help the.. government : · ·· · · A._ ~· and their sister unions in Vietnam ro re.;;ist' Communist aggres:. ·· · sion and at the same time hrin 6 aoout needt:.rl economic and social -. 1