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Folder, "JCS -- SIGMA I‑66, Final Report, 9/66," Agency Files, NSF, Box 33 (Item)

from third countries, fate and other influences and to prepare a scenario projection. Three such moves were· followed by final critiques on 27 September. (Col T. J. McDonald, USA, Chier, Cold War ~ivision) The initial scenario for SIGMAadvanced time

Folder, "[NSC Meeting on] Overflights of Cuba, 5/2/1964, Volume 2, Tab 2," National Security Council Meetings Files, NSF, Box 1 (Item)

of an Attempted Shoot-down of a U-2. 11 The conclusion was that Castro prefers to try to halt the U -2 flights by pressure at the UN and else where, but, failing this, there is a significant, and, over time, a growing chance that he will try a shoot-down

Folder, "McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 19, January 19 - February 4, 1966 [2 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 6 [1 of 2] (Item)

into another unmanageable idea like the MLF after I get out of here. (I myself spent a lot of time backing the MLF, but once burned, twice shy.) McG. B. THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON Friday, January 28, 1966, 9 A. M. MR. PRESIDENT: Another Wise Man bites

Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 49, November 1-7, 1967 [2 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 25 (Item)

: progress is being made. don•t strain. publicly to convince people Douglas Dillon: -- spend time not on how we got into Viet Nam, but on po_sition we're in and real choices we face; -- clarify what we are doiug on the ground and in bombing; D ~~!:-1!:.0

Folder, "India: Food, 1964-1965 [1 of 5]," Files of Robert Komer, NSF, Box 24 (Item)

stopped in and abowed his atJ'ong p:reference to have that group chaired by AID. Bell won. (3) Freeman, under questioning by Bell, sald he'd handle overall political management. When Bell queationed whether Freeman would. have the time for that, given

Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 49, November 1-7, 1967 [2 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 25 (Item)

: progress is being made. don•t strain. publicly to convince people Douglas Dillon: -- spend time not on how we got into Viet Nam, but on po_sition we're in and real choices we face; -- clarify what we are doiug on the ground and in bombing; D ~~!:-1!:.0

Folder, "Korea - Park Visit, 5/65," Country Files, NSF, Box 256 (Item)

TO VISIT. HE AGREEDSIMULTANEOUS ANNOUNCEMENT SEOULANDWASHINGTON AS SUGGESTED. . PRESIDENTIALSECRETARYSUGGESTSANNOUNCEMENT ON WEDNESDAYp FEB 24 (SEOUL TIME) AT AN HOURCONVENIENT TO WASHINGTON. I SAID ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD PROBABLY BE APPROXIMArELY AS FOLLOWS

Folder, "NUCLEAR - Indian Nuclear Problem [1 of 2]," Files of Charles E. Johnson, NSF, Box 33 (Item)

with respect to the Indians is to buy time during which, hopefully, we can move forward on broader fronts to bring under more permanent control the dangers inherent in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. /s/ DeanRusk Dean Rusk •• ·CEIVED ~-os I 0\1'S

Folder, "Japan, Sato's Visit Memos and Cables, 1/11-14/65 [4 of 4]," Country Files, NSF, Box 253 [1 of 2] (Item)

. Bundy said that . we would be discussing with Sato the problem of Japanese trade with Communist China and in that context we would also be noting the problem of trade with North Korea. The Pak Visit Ambassador Kim again raised the question of the timing

Folder, "NSAM # 333: Follow_up on Miller Report, 5/13/1965," National Security Action Memorandums, NSF, Box 7 (Item)

such authority in bilateral bargainning. The difference between Commerce and the rest of us is on timing and on the relation of this issue to Vietnam. The matter of timing is minor Jack Connor would like to have further "public education" before ~~~ .. blR in 1

Folder, "[NSC Meeting on] Vietnam/France/Germany, 5/22/1968, Volume 5, Tab 68," National Security Council Meetings Files, NSF, Box 2 (Item)

ing for a long time. The President: The North Vietnamese made a pretty good bade. They get partial suspension of the bombing for merely sitting and talking in Paris. Under Secretary Katzenbach : The fate of the discussions in Paris turns

Folder, "Korea - Vol. 2 , Memos, 7/64 - 8/65," Country Files, NSF, Box 254 (Item)

expressing concern over the recent ratification of the Korea-Japan normalization agreementso At the time of delivery, our Embassy thanked the messenger and stated that his letter would receive due consideration. Since the Embassy has already orally acknow

Folder, "Japan, Sato's Visit Memos and Cables, 1/11-14/65 [3 of 4]," Country Files, NSF, Box 253 [1 of 2] (Item)

, there is some evidence of admix ture with Malayan and Caucasoid strains. The only important minority group at the present time is the approximately 600,000 Koreans. There are also much smaller groups of Chinese and Caucasian residents. Religion Buddhism

Folder, "Bombs in Orbit - Committee of Principals," Files of Charles E. Johnson, NSF, Box 11 (Item)

in advance of presentation . 3. The U.S -. statement would include language designed to provide a basis in the public record for re-opening the queo?tion of verification at a future time should it become desirable to do so and for withdrawing if necessar y

Memorandum # 275, Exception of items from trade negotiations, 12/20/1963 (Item)

time, it is only reasonable to anticipate that pressure from the same sources, and from members of Congress, will be exerted on Government officials to give advance commit ments that certain products will be placed on the exceptions list. • v

Memorandum # 279, Military Assistance to India and Pakistan, 2/8/1964 (Item)

·each year will depend on continuing Pakistani and Indian performance. 4. Our approaches to India and Pakistan should be timed for opti mum impact. For example, I do not believe that we .i:;hould initi ally approach Pakistan until we have assessed

Memorandum # 314, Resumption of Operations in SEA, 9/10/1964 (Item)

; to the extent that the situation permits, such action should precede larger decisions. If such larger decisions are required at any time by a change in the situation, they will be taken. · ~

Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 90: Aug. 1‑10, 1968 [2 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 38 (Item)

, lnjurie• and material damage. I am also prof011Ddly arateful for the very important and timely help received from the United State• through your active Embaaey, which has contributed ao much to alleviating the depr•••ing aituatlon in the affected region

Folder, "JCS - War Games, Vol. 5, 1967-1968," Agency Files, NSF, Box 31 (Item)

of NU-66 and the Honolulu Conference, a 29 minute video-swmnary of the politico-military games NU I and II-66 was presented a second time at the Pentagon and other interested on 24 March, for senior participants officials. Individual film showings were

Folder, "Jamaica, Volume II," Special Head of State Correspondence Files, NSF, Box 29 (Item)

the Pre ident: QOOTE: Dear Mr. Prime Ministert Your thoughtful tragic hot 1 fire letter the in Kingston last month both saddened and pleased me. caused by* regarding the fire. the loss I regret At the iame time I am very glad that our men

Folder, "NSAM # 337: US Intelligence Facilities in Pakistan, 8/10/1965," National Security Action Memorandums, NSF, Box 7 (Item)

that end at"e feasible. 2. The passage of time, however, has necessitated certain changes in specific recommendations: 3.L/ lb>l 1, (,) a. Recommendation 1 (e) should be deleted. A shipborne test was conducted with unsatisfactory results. (The Department

Folder, "NSAM # 343: Appointment of Special Assistant to the President for Peaceful Construction in Vietnam, 3/28/1966," National Security Action Memorandums, NSF, Box 7 (Item)

ensuring full and timely support of the U.S. Mission in Saigon on matters within his purview. In accordance with established procedures, any instructions to the U.S. Mission in Saigon will be issued through the Secretary of State. In carrying out

Cable, to International Situation Room, 11/26/63 (Item)

ALVARADOSAYS-.,~! SAW OSWALDIN THE CUBANEMBASSYIN MEXICO, BUT ·,BASEDON THE ."INFORMATIONAVAILABLE . • . . TO THlA GENCY AS Of THIS DATEOSWALD.VISITED TkE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO FOR THE FIRST TIME AFtER .2, SEPTtM'BtR 1963.) GP•l 2100 &Elil ,. • J

Cable, to White House Attn: Bundy, 11/29/63, #9 (Item)

OF ALVARADO SAYSHE "DOUBTS·ALVARAOO·s STORYANDWILLBEGINWORK TO "BREAK"HIM. THIS INFORMATION WAS TIME RECEIVEDIN MEXICO CITY AT 1330 HOURSWASHINGTON 19 NOVEMBER 1963. GP•l 0900 DECLASfflllID E.O. 12356,Sec.3.4 NJJ ·9 ~ - ,;Jfi?R''f-;;)1)--93 BJ k«(} •N

Cable, to White House Attn: Bundy, 11/30/63 (Item)

SFI 005 00 ESF OE YEKADL 86063 30/20302 NOV 0 30l957Z FMCIA TO WHITEHOUSEATTN: MR. MCGEORGE BUNDY~ 20 52. DEPTOF STATEATTN: MR. U. ALEXISJOHNSON FBI ZEM SECR!T l. OURSTATIONIN MEXICOCITY HASJUST ADVISEDUS THATAT 1230 WASHINGTON TIME TODAY30

Memo, Rostow to LBJ, 6/5/67, 5.45 PM (Item)

is roughly moving shorten it by getting at the substance possible time. the Iranians in Israeli's favor, I believe we can of a settlement at the earliest

Situation Room Log, 4/5 June 1967 (Item)

SITUATION ROOM LOG DATE ___________ DUTY OFFICER TIME ...,. 4/5 JUNE1967 Ray Wotring ACTION 1710 Called Mr. Rostow and informed him of a FLASHfrom Cairo reporting that the UAR Vice President would be departing Cairo on Wednesday 7 June

Hotline message, LBJ to Kosygin, 6/10/67, 10.58 AM (Item)

representative suggests. • Bull himself replied it would take time to contact Damascus. Meanwhile Israel has an nounced that it regards cease-fire as in effect now. This seems to make it even more urgent that you use your channels to Damascus to ensure

Hotline message, LBJ to Kosygin, 6/7/67, 11.18 AM (Item)

, while noting that he did not know of the reaction oi the Arab side. He also reported that the Arab Ambassadors were silent on this point. At the time of this message, we ourselves are not clear as to their attitude,·with the possible exception of Jordan

Folder, "INDIA - December 1963-1964 [3 of 4]," Files of Robert W. Komer, NSF, Box 23 (Item)

!'\ a cable on this in the next few days which will go to you as a matter of -routine. However, I do want you to have this background with the bope that "you will find time on your busy schedule" to give it a lift. (Extract from letter from Chester

Folder, "McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 15, September 23 - October 14, 1965 [2 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 5 (Item)

are allowing the almost wholly goverr...rnent-controlled media to feed the growing anti-US and pro-Chicom sen.thnent in Pakistan. Oux Embassy and USIA report' US prestige is at an all-time low. The risk here is that Ayub may paint himself into a corner

Folder, "NSAM # 304: U.S. Relations with Eastern Europe, 6/10/1964 [2 of 3]," National Security Action Memorandums, NSF, Box 4 (Item)

crisis, Moscow has appeared to recognize that the present balance of power is relatively unfavorable to it and will remain so for a long time. As a result, Soviet policy has been essentially d:!.rected toward keeping international ten s5.on within bounds

Folder, "NSAM # 341: The Direction, Coordination and Supervision of Interdepartmental Activities Overseas, 3/2/1966, [2 of 2]" National Security Action Memorandums, NSF, Box 7 (Item)

, the SIG has met with decreasing frequency during the last year. In the last six months of 1966, the SIG met three times and has met .-only twice in 1967. It is significant that it has taken no part in the conduct of our most serious and complicated

Folder, "NUCLEAR - Indian Nuclear Problem [2 of 2]," Files of Charles E. Johnson, NSF, Box 33 (Item)

. should be prepared to pay for such agreements. security optimum c. How far it is in the U.S. interest to go in meeting Indian concerns, what form such action mi'~t take, and what the timing might be. d. Whether need to be pursued. there are other

Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 47, October 21-24, 1967 [1 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 24 (Item)

MEMORANDUM Participants: Z3, 1967 OF CONVERSATION Abba Eban, Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Avraham Harman, Ambassador of Israel Ephraim Evron, Minister of Israel W. W. Rostow Harold H. Saunders Time: 11 a. m., October Z3,· 1967, in Mr. Rostow 1

Folder, "NSAM # 335: Preparation of Arms Control Program, 6/28/1965," National Security Action Memorandums, NSF, Box 7 (Item)

Presidential decision on the substance of a programo I believe this is a realistic schedule which will make possible the timely and orderly considera tion by the President of the subjects covered by NSAM 335. This proposed schedule presents one difficulty

Folder, "McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 8, January 1 - February 28, 1965 [2 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 2 [2 of 2] (Item)

am, and I think it ls simpler if he simply comes at Max Taylor's invitation ln tho same plane. Moreover, the quick departure which I suggest hardly gives time to get him out to the area ln any other way and, as I say. I am sure that there la no point

Folder, "Shastri Visit (Proposed) [2 of 3]," Files of Robert W. Komer, NSF, Box 22-1 (Item)

to infoKm L.K ..Jha that Prime Minhter's feeling while· th~ Preddent first time thereafter, three before there weeks of Jaruary. time will that tG have the Prime Min.tat.er at any is a real Cong?'

Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 39, August 18-31, 1967 [5 of 5]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 21 (Item)

weapons h~ve spread. Today, for the first time, we have within our grasp a way to arrest this dangerous development. Since 1945, five nations have come into possession of this dread c apabi lity. . We believe now •• as we did then•• that even one

Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 4, Tabs C-M," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 48 (Item)

and that it must gain victory this year or collapse? l. Hanoi's strategy warfare in South of revol~tionary Vietnam has always en.braced two propositions: protracted time. to prepare for a struggle-and to seek victory in the shortest of large US forces