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  • an answer to a letter Senator Symington had sent to the Secretary on February 3 connecting the Academy with foreign aid. On February 17, the Secretary declined to sign the letter and has not yet done so. You will recall the draft suggested
  • the exercise called for by NSAM 298. Therefore, no formal reply is neces­ sary at this time. I suggest, however, that we circu­ late the draft response which has been prepared, so that it can be available for study. hi1 6McGeor DISTRIBUTION: Bell, AID McCone
  • , NSAM 297--Latin American Military Aid " Box 4 RESTRICTION CODES (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356'governing access to national security information. (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document. (C) Closed in accordance
  • Foreign aid
  • Folder, "NSAM # 297: Latin American Military Aid, 4/22/1964," National Security Action Memorandums, NSF, Box 4
  • , and the increase in Soviet influence. He will dwell on the point that all this could have been avoid ed if the US had maintained good relations with Egypt. He will expand his thesis that without material aconom ic aid from the U.S., Nasser and those around him
  • FOR OF STATE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT WASHINGTON November OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR MEMORANDUM SUBJECT: 28, 1967 FOR THE PRESIDENT Action by the Senate Appropriations Committee on Foreign Aid The Senate Appropriations Committee came through
  • thinks he got a nod of the head from you on this at Punta del Este. GUINEA (Tab D) Value: $3. 7 million Commodities: Wheat flour - - 11, 000 tons Tallow 3, 000 tons Oil 2, 000 tons Cotton 9, 200 Bales - 3 - GUINEA (continued) Food aid is about all we
  • March 19. The paper has the concurrence of' the Department of Defense and AID. There follows a summary of the important points covered in the action program. The United states has agreed to a Libyan request to discuss in Libya on or about April 29 tqe
  • . Secretary Rusk w arned against th e dange r that the East Germans might react to the changes go ing on in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere by provoking additional tensions with the West. The Secretary s aid h e h ad B e rlin particularly in mind, and mentioned
  • probably not risk a cutoff of theee funds. 5. Iraq 1s the only revolutionary and nationalistic Arab state that can provide a base for active subversion in the Gulf. In the past, though it has given some sporadic aid and training to dissidents in the area
  • !.-JG AFTER JANUARY 20, ANDWEREPLIEDAFFIR~ATIVELY. HE ~AID ALL SHOULDPUSH FCH~A~DAS RAPIDLYAS ?OSSiolE BEFORETHATDATE. . 15. ~E CONCLUDED 3Y SAYINGTHAf WEWISHEDTO EMPHASIZE THE THREEPOINTS THATWEREOF URGEN7IMPORlANCE: FIRST, THE C°ESSATION' OF ALL
  • everyvvhere except in Jordan. We still were holding off in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia . Mr. Gaud reported that we h ad had aid programs in s ix of the fourteen Arab countries (plus Israel)- - Sudan , Jord an , Tunisia, the UAR , Morocco, Israel -- and a pipeline
  • accounts; . (3) the need for Japan to do more in economic aid to Asia . ~'··-.'l :"' ' ·· r He noted that the upcoming visits of Foreign Minister Miki (Sept) and Prime Minister Sato (November) made consideration of these questions immediately
  • The Administrator, Agency for International Development SUBJECT: Study of Possible Redeployment of U.S. Division now Stationed in Korea This is to request that the Secretary of State coordinate a joint State-AID-Defense study which will enable me
  • of foreign embas­ sies, including the Soviet, have been withdrawn to Taiz in the south. President Iryani has arrived in Cairo, presumably to make a last-ditch appeal for Egyptian aid, although he may well feel safer away from Sana. Sources of Aid
  • . Paragraph three of this NSAM directed that the Departments of State, Defense and AID study proposals made by Ambassador Kennan .in Belgrade's airgram A-543 and prepare for the President's consideration possible courses of action. The enclosed memorandum
  • .--------- B. Johnson ~ 1) ( ~~ ~ ~Jl~ ) NATIONAL SECURITY AC'I1CN 11EMORANDUM NO. THE SECRETARY OF STATE THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TIIE DIRECTOR .QF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE THE AD!vIINISTRATOR, AID In view of the assigmnent of Mr. William Sullivan to Saigon
  • . • • -'w\f.AL,o:;• r~o A , ... , ... ·'j ~ ~ n.d. A n.d. A '5-/(p-~QO/ t-----'6.--1p:J..-., "AID Strategy C FILE for Korea" 7 p. LOCATION of Robert w. Komer December 1963 March 1966. NSF: Files KOREA RESTRICTION (Al (Bl (Cl Box 38 CODES
  • on India- .... ao long as he is- ia power lndta will pur•ue vigorowsly the political and He doea.n•t want to put the President economic policies outlined above. on tho spot by asking for aid any mare than .Ayub did, but what are th President's own view1
  • assert that in this mood the Indians a:::-~ highly unlikely to compromise on Kashmir. Instead continued hold-up of US aid is rapidly being interpreted as political pres sure on India to give up Kash.i..--nir. Embassy Delhi contends that if we hold up
  • ..... ,.. .... ef lta _, ladla Jau --•• la eacb cu• We baYe t. declcle MW c:Wc•. ... •--• It ••:aid N wonla ._ •••• 1. ladla c...W Mly • DD aay ef..., •• mlp& tq .. laa-• IMla elf .. Wlalcll ar• •• ....... ... tnad• a. ps-, ■•ale cvnat
  • •ucncy within a month. AID l• much inter••ted. and l bope thi• can 10 up promptly. Howa.rd Wri1IIU .istan eokllDZNHAL M.EMOaANDUM SUBIECT: FOR THE PRESIDENT Afpe,adst.a■ - Loa.a for Kajakal Hyuoelactric ,..r Plaat appnw.J. of a $l2 mUUon loaa
  • V.irs. Gan hie ane if t e 22 o wan ed he aide o me tion to get explore The S cretary ma da e. FORM • l S- again behind the PreBident the importance nteersn. 4 of this point "None. He par icularly an energe including In a free ary
  • . 3. SUGGESTED SCHEDULEIS AS FOLLOWS~ WEDNESDAY, MARCH 8 WEDNESDAYARRIVE ENTEBBE LATE AFTERNOON, PAGE2 RUDTCRll43U SECRET CALL ON PRESIDENTOBOTEAT STATEHOUSEENTEBBECMRS. KATZENBACH CALLON MRS. OBOTE81 SAMETIME>. VISIT AID AGRICULTURAL INFO
  • there we.re two quhftions mor;t difficult in this situa.tio1.1, and one was thot7the Suez Canal and the other that of Jerusalem. He s aid tha t one of the difficulties was that the Arabs constantly sup.ported each othar in everything; for exatnple, assuming
  • . His judgment is firmly that it is ·the lesser of two evils: if we do not have such an explol'atory visit. p~easure.s ue likely to grow promptly to expand Israeli military aid in. the wake of Soviet military delivery to the Arabs. He argues further
  • with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Developmento From 1958 to 1961 he was again in Washington, that time as Indian Commissioner General for Economic Affairs, a post especially created to deal on a global basis with questions of foreign aid for India. 0 0
  • offered whole wheat flour (35,000 tons) and more dry m1lk for the balance of about $3 million. In addition, it has offered to allow India to use a substantial sum, from the remaining unallocated portion of its regular aid pledge, for the purchase
  • Food aid
  • Sovi et and E gyptian aid . He no\v appears trying to get Enosis with demilitarization of t h e is land. 5. b. the Con go, the re are s ome signs of improvement but milit arily, the situation i s still critical. o. Tanganyika and anzibar
  • . McGeor ge Bundy referred to the pending Presidential speech and discussed the proposed plan for a Southeast Asia D evelopment Association. Mr. Gaud (AID) and Mr . Rusk both indicated their -- ~,,,,..¥ _, :,"... '1
  • to reissue this NSAM? State says it is a protiemo BUNDY BKS MEMORANDUM FOR MR . McGEORGE TiiE WHITE HOUS Subj ct: 7 Reissuance of NSAM 217: Visits to South Vietna Official On January 25, 1 63 you issued to the Secretaries ·Of Stat and Def ens nd th AID
  • on this is sue should go no !unhe r than the lVlay 10 Defense Ministers' statement. Greece - We should r esume military aid to Greece . The importance of our military position there has increased as a r esult of the Soviet iHese:1ce i:i the Mediterranean
  • everywhere except were holding off in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. for evacuation of in Jordan. We still Mr. Gaud reported that we had had aid programs in six of the fourtee~ Arab countries (plus Israel)--Sudan, Jordan, Tunisia, the UAR, Morocco, Israel
  • that their own interests would best be served by joint or parallel actiono Alternative 1: To exert maximum pressure to avert the decisiono We might, for example, threaten to termi­ nate economic and technical aid and serve notice that we would not back India up
  • in pacification activities. Senior staff sections working exclusively on Vietnam and targetted on pacification are now operational where none existed eighteen months ago: -z- - AID has organized a special Vietnam Bureau; is better focused in its Revolutionary
  • . 10:15 pm ..... i 9 66 I ' MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT ...- .... ,. .,... ~ ................. -...Y .... . ... -.. George Woods -is eager to -start working over the Indians on a selfhelp and aid package as soon as ha knows whe:re we stand
  • . There are admittedly some tough issues to be resolved. both in Our aid review has given us a good go-round on policy and in tactics. some of them. but now we need to follow that up with some good solid projects. There's also the political qucstion--whether pushing hard
  • work· .._ out a ·Kashmir settlement the United States will not give aid to , . either country .. This in effect would give Pakistan a veto on U.S. •• ..: .• aid to India. In effect this would permit one party to sabotage the •..•·· Tashkent Agreement
  • and implemented. 4'0P SECftE'f "• ! .... - 'fOP SEGRE~ - 3 ­ 3. Provide financial support to ensure the stability of the South Vietnamese economy. More foreign aid in 1965 will be needed, as well as additional military equipment. 4. Train Vietnamese