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  • of the Vietnamese Gover~ment do not fall below the levels sustained .b y the United States in the time of the Diem Government. This does not · exclude arrangements for economy on the MAP acc9unt with respect to accounting for ammunition, or any other readjustments
  • of President Chiari ( CJ,~ ) to the United States o We have been carrying these items in the lvbnthly Follow- up Report and have requested the Bureau of Inter- American Affairs to prepare a progress report on these directives from time to time . However
  • in time to allow him to give full consideration thereto before the scheduled events are to take place. ·The Review Committee is also directed to perform the functions specified in NSAM No. 269. . DECLASSIFIED . Authonty Ns e- . ?'1roPosz. · i. f
  • affecting a Plebiscite. C. District Political Patterns, Problems and People. D. Attitudes toward Affiliation. E. Timing and Terms of a Plebiscite. F. Preparation for a Plebiscite. G. Present and Post-Plebiscite Territorial Government. H
  • of ·this month so that there ·may be time for careful consideration and decision before my meeting with Prime Minister Wilson on December 7 and 8. • " SECBE'iE' .,.
  • in planning for the operation of existing forces and the development of future forces: intelligence, deployment, targeting, considerations affecting use at times of crisis, res.e arch, development, production and budgeting, etc. The primary operational focus
  • to pay for such agreements. c. How far it is in the U .s. interest to go in meeting Indian security concerns, what form such action miSht take, and what the optimum timing might be. d. Whether there are other approaches to the problem which need
  • will be appointed Deputy for Pacification {Revolutionary Development) with personal rank of ambassador. To this end the present functions and personnel of: the Office of Civil Operations of the U. S. Mission will become a part of MACY. For the time being
  • At Department's.suggestion I wi:thheld demarche this subject planned for December 3 but am now increasingly concerned over scant time remaining available to work out with GOP new arrange_ment covering period on and after January 1, 1964. Foreign Minister now at SC meeting
  • to the word "DEFCON" since the time of the Cuba missile crisis. We will guidance receive given in the morning by Defense. a copy of the press
  • 7. T8PSECRET THE DIRECTOR OFCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 28 November 1963 had intended to discuss this with President Johnson but ran out of time. I am sure we will get some wild statements out of Havana if Castro's speech last night is any indicator
  • &ft &Dct·a1fJOelated rmde&r woapoo.• to Canadian buea aa aA -a1enda item 111 lhe US.Cana~ MlAl•terf.al Jola& Comnnuee cm Defo.uo on Juae ZS. It la undot'etood that the aovor~t ot Canada ha• no objecUon to CIJ,u lderatlon ot We Uem at thla time. z
  • Will assist the Secretary of' State in exploring problems of · procedure and timing connected with holding discussions with the .Soviet Union and in proposing for my consideration the channels which would be most desirable from our point of view
  • of the enlisted men's barracks at Qui Nbon. As of that time , o ne U.S. soldier was known to be dead, 20 injured, and 20 missing. Presumably, the missing soldie rs are bur ied under the rubble of the billet. Mr. McGeorge Bundy summarized the discussion
  • ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified
  • departments on complex overseas problems, and assure that no sector of the foreign front is neglected at a time of preoccupation with some overriding problem. [Department of State Bulletin, March 28, 1966, Vol. LIV, No. 1396] SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK'S
  • and diplomatic. I see a movement upward all the way . We should be escalating . Personally I would mine Haiphong at the same time and get the political flak over with. The President: I think that public approval is deteriorating , and that it will continue to go
  • . PRESIDENT: SUBJECT: 1.. Hainan Territorial Waters Rescue Operation Facts The Seventh Fleet would like to launch its rescue chopper from the Kearsage at 0400 its time (3-3/4 hours from now). It would take 45 minutes to get to the scene. They hope
  • are still basically the same as·those developed in 1952, at a time when substantial U. S. a.nd Allied forces and resources were engaged in Korea and therefore not available in Europe. Because of this history ·and-the size of the nuclear shield provided
  • of our effort in the south. (This last sounds like an effort to have it both ways.) 2. I continue to be a strong believer in a December pause, and of course the time is getting shorter every minute. Rusk and McNamara and I plan to review this matter
  • in Cuba would undoubtedly result in the transmittal to these other countries of the methods of dealing with the EC M . In addition , there may come a time when we have a critical ne ed to look at a SAM - defended site. If we use the ECM now, we would thr
  • Tuesday night, because we are accepting Secretary Rusk's judgment that there are enough activities going on to make it prudent to wait until that time before you speak. We rejected the idea of a personally delivered message to Congress because proposed
  • CONVERSATION I MENTIONED THAT AGREEMENT COtJTINIJED TO BE HELD UP ON ~ATTERS I HM) ~ffNTIONED EARLIER BUT THAT THESE MIGHT BE RESOLVED AT ANY TIME AND IF so -I"WOULD TAKE THE . LIBERTY OF MAKING DIRECT CO~TACT WITH THE PRIM~ MINISTER IF THERE SHOULD
  • this the approach is not likely leaders At the same time, security needs, to deter an Indian nuclear weapons program indefinitely. 4. Possibility of a "Peaceful" Explosion. other· immediate issue worth noting at this S~&IMITED ... There is one time
  • . At the present time, the situation in the Khe Sanh area is quiet. No enemy contacts have been reported in the area since the attack on at 6:25 PM EST, the details of which are Hill 861 ended yesterday described in the succeeding paragraphs. 2. At 3:00 PM EST
  • leaders that there was no need for our country to develop a FOBS system. While develop­ ment of it could be initiated at any time for relatively rapid deployment, our analyses conclude that it would not improve our strategic offensive posture
  • leverage in Iraq, but the real danger is the new Soviet involvement in the oil business. The Soviet wells won't be in production for about two years--the time could vary greatly either way--hb.t then the oil will have to be moved out of Iraq. This means
  • of our meeting with you last week. Jack Valenti has given us time at 11 :30 on Friday for a meeting with you, and your night reading for tomorrow will have the papers for Friday's discussion. Mean­ while 1 I have one further thought that you may wish
  • the Pentagon; that is, all the members of the JCS and the service Secretaries, as well as Clifford and Nitze; -- the Strategic Rese rve call-up (par a. 3) would be announced at the same time as the call-up to support the thirty thousand deployment, but it would
  • OF THE PRIMEMINISTER 21, 1964 Dear Mr. President: I was very pleased to have an opportunity to the United meet you during my recent visit to attend the funeral of General MacArthur. to States Knowing the tremendous demands upon your time, especially under
  • or 1976 or any other time. It is because of the victories of our compatriots in the South, '' their defeat of two American dry season offensives and the resistance of the North to 2 1/ 2 years of air attacks that we are getting more support and assistance
  • Vietnam . W e have asked many times what the North Vietnamese would do if we stopped the bombing. We have hea rd nothing to date in reply. c. There appear to be elements of caution on the other s ide -- in Hanoi as we 11 as in Moscow. Our purpose
  • ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified
  • and cool-headed set ·of proposals for this meeting. We can also fend off Soviet propaganda against the MLF as long as we are smart about it. It is true that it would be good to have more time, but this kind of last-minute Soviet acceptance is a standard
  • message to Cy Vance: "Dear Cy: "At a critical time for peace in the Eastern Mediterranean you accepted from me at a moment 1 s notice a difficult and highly important mission. I asked nothing less of you than to help the Governments of Greece, Turkey
  • ·t:o\·iards"·'a · return .-to ·-'c 6nstituti6nal{sm·; . without at the same time undermining .his own relationship with the government leaders or provoking them to a final confrontation . ... . bo . :-: . . · . : .· c·•.. . The 'Amer.ic.a n
  • the bureaucracy. Despite your push and the efiorts of a number of interested experts, concrete progress has been ~low. Bell has long stressed the importan.ce of getting on top of the population problem, but now is the time for his mission directors to step up
  • of Staff and higher authority turn for an immediate review of the situation and for advice as to the available courses of action in time of emergency. The Deputy Director for Operations (NMCC), a General/flag rank officer, and the NMCC maintain an around
  • of your invitation and authorize start of negotiations on FY 1967 assistance, with the _o bjective of completion at a time which would permit signing of loan agreement during the Frei visit. I have reviewed the negotiating instructions on our assistance