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  • ,. such as a transfer of authority to the President of the Dominican Senate. (President Bosch had gone into exile.) But neither the junta nor its Dominican opponents showed much readiness for compro­ mise, and the U.S. position was further weakened as time went
  • are sounding Phil out on the pos~ibility of urging the " coup government simply to expel Andreas. No one believes that Greek politics can settle down until he is out of the picture, so expulsion would meet our domes tic needs while at the same time being a gain
  • there is a greater linking of the idea of talking than there has been at any time since I started following North Vietnamese matters in the autumn of 1963. (Since that time, I have talked with all of the Indians, Canadians, and Poles about their visits to Hanoi
  • journalistic career after graduation from college by serving an apprenticeship on the Glasgow (Scotland) Herald. He has worked for the Times of India, one of India's leading English-language dailies, since 1952, serving as an assistant editor for the Bombay
  • from third countries, fate and other influences and to prepare a scenario projection. Three such moves were· followed by final critiques on 27 September. (Col T. J. McDonald, USA, Chier, Cold War ~ivision) The initial scenario for SIGMAadvanced time
  • into another unmanageable idea like the MLF after I get out of here. (I myself spent a lot of time backing the MLF, but once burned, twice shy.) McG. B. THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON Friday, January 28, 1966, 9 A. M. MR. PRESIDENT: Another Wise Man bites
  • to dis cu s some urgent problems. I have told her that· I shall be very glad to do so just as soon as you get back, and I send this note to askii you will call Mr. Marvin Watson on your arrival so that no time will be lost in having this discussion
  • affirmative response of the United States to the proposal of the Secretary General of August 16, 1965 (which we have never surfaced) at which time the Secretary General called for "a return to the essentials of the Geneva Agreement. 11 Ambassador Goldberg also
  • the Paks have openly flaunted both the Indians and the United States by inviting the Chinese to visit Pakistan at the time the Indian Prime Minister is in Washington and secondly by displaying Chinese tanks '\ openly in a recent parade. Indian leaders hope
  • ~ ecise answer at this time in vi.Aw numh?"t' of unknown facto s cited by Embassy question~ fa~tor o .amp lic4t. ·n g de~i~U s~ go 0 Clearance11 s/s - Mro Morris NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY I
  • 1ith the Gandhi visit bed;nd us. it is time to begin shoring up the Pakistan side of our affairs in the s ubeontinent. first step is to tell Ayub ~ hat you said to _ rs. --andhi about Indo- ak relations and l ashrnir,. since- we promised to "'eep
  • elections in SVN indicate popular support for the. war. The time has now arrived to achieve decisive military victory even if it requires escalation of our efforts. After the enemy has been defeated, we can devote our tremendous resources to social
  • rnma of not putting domestic plan ndi at the same time a fo as s r noted th·s year .. o how we because emphas ·~dng the r m g hat given ot of b Q iet c agitationo J -the g tenn g 0 it needs no maki g a claim s) e., here
  • ........ D. C. 4, 1966 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL .Sli:CRET-- 23 December 1965 lilEMO FOR McG B SUBJECT: China War Game In order to eliminate the conflict between the war game schedule and the ACDA Committee of Principals meetings, game time
  • .. time • J'Ollg• ot ._. ah f•......UY bopellil tb&t U •-- bu b6es,•.al .. & tbcNp a eo tely -tUy ,o1.uo. &II the elHtlOD way c fcnad to . ue uaue may ttm.aia ·.po . lble lo~ the for.. ·w. fQ&mte., F. la ff r4 to wana b*. feua of a llldat:aaatmow
  • hope • tod•y~Headquarters_ol""_the ...Jfaflonal Liberation Front (NLF) more than has been felt tor months. 'l'boae who ·kept the faith may nowl)e vindicated but there is no time to philosophize. In the early hours this morning an emissary, the brother
  • • t rougly antl• Ame r lcaa mood a .l tho, preaeat time.• McQ, B .. (P• S. ) _ Stadelhofer has standing instructions from us to press very hard in such cases, and we have made it clear to him that they operate in this case. But it seems best to go
  • to build up national language and at the same time prepare young people for higher education. He pressed his case for a secondary school in English language and his hope that the United States could assist. Again Vice President expressed great sympathy
  • or military areas. e. A Control Team examines the "Move Message" which each team provides and determines the positions of other countries and influences. A scenario projection is then prepared which advances the situation to a new point in time and requires
  • "face" by demonstrating we cannot be defeated militarily (compared with total withdrawal). 2. No assurance that we could make a better bargain. 3. 3.. Permit our allies and South Viet­ Nam more time to ·adjust and make their own deals
  • ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified