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  • leverage in Iraq, but the real danger is the new Soviet involvement in the oil business. The Soviet wells won't be in production for about two years--the time could vary greatly either way--hb.t then the oil will have to be moved out of Iraq. This means
  • of our meeting with you last week. Jack Valenti has given us time at 11 :30 on Friday for a meeting with you, and your night reading for tomorrow will have the papers for Friday's discussion. Mean­ while 1 I have one further thought that you may wish
  • the Pentagon; that is, all the members of the JCS and the service Secretaries, as well as Clifford and Nitze; -- the Strategic Rese rve call-up (par a. 3) would be announced at the same time as the call-up to support the thirty thousand deployment, but it would
  • OF THE PRIMEMINISTER 21, 1964 Dear Mr. President: I was very pleased to have an opportunity to the United meet you during my recent visit to attend the funeral of General MacArthur. to States Knowing the tremendous demands upon your time, especially under
  • or 1976 or any other time. It is because of the victories of our compatriots in the South, '' their defeat of two American dry season offensives and the resistance of the North to 2 1/ 2 years of air attacks that we are getting more support and assistance
  • Vietnam . W e have asked many times what the North Vietnamese would do if we stopped the bombing. We have hea rd nothing to date in reply. c. There appear to be elements of caution on the other s ide -- in Hanoi as we 11 as in Moscow. Our purpose
  • ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified
  • and cool-headed set ·of proposals for this meeting. We can also fend off Soviet propaganda against the MLF as long as we are smart about it. It is true that it would be good to have more time, but this kind of last-minute Soviet acceptance is a standard
  • message to Cy Vance: "Dear Cy: "At a critical time for peace in the Eastern Mediterranean you accepted from me at a moment 1 s notice a difficult and highly important mission. I asked nothing less of you than to help the Governments of Greece, Turkey
  • ·t:o\·iards"·'a · return .-to ·-'c 6nstituti6nal{sm·; . without at the same time undermining .his own relationship with the government leaders or provoking them to a final confrontation . ... . bo . :-: . . · . : .· c·•.. . The 'Amer.ic.a n
  • the bureaucracy. Despite your push and the efiorts of a number of interested experts, concrete progress has been ~low. Bell has long stressed the importan.ce of getting on top of the population problem, but now is the time for his mission directors to step up
  • of Staff and higher authority turn for an immediate review of the situation and for advice as to the available courses of action in time of emergency. The Deputy Director for Operations (NMCC), a General/flag rank officer, and the NMCC maintain an around
  • of your invitation and authorize start of negotiations on FY 1967 assistance, with the _o bjective of completion at a time which would permit signing of loan agreement during the Frei visit. I have reviewed the negotiating instructions on our assistance
  • from third countries, fate and other influences and to prepare a scenario projection. Three such moves were· followed by final critiques on 27 September. (Col T. J. McDonald, USA, Chier, Cold War ~ivision) The initial scenario for SIGMAadvanced time
  • of an Attempted Shoot-down of a U-2. 11 The conclusion was that Castro prefers to try to halt the U -2 flights by pressure at the UN and else ­ where, but, failing this, there is a significant, and, over time, a growing chance that he will try a shoot-down
  • into another unmanageable idea like the MLF after I get out of here. (I myself spent a lot of time backing the MLF, but once burned, twice shy.) McG. B. THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON Friday, January 28, 1966, 9 A. M. MR. PRESIDENT: Another Wise Man bites
  • : progress is being made. don•t strain. publicly to convince people Douglas Dillon: -- spend time not on how we got into Viet Nam, but on po_sition we're in and real choices we face; -- clarify what we are doiug on the ground and in bombing; D ~~!:-1!:.0
  • stopped in and abowed his atJ'ong p:reference to have that group chaired by AID. Bell won. (3) Freeman, under questioning by Bell, sald he'd handle overall political management. When Bell queationed whether Freeman would. have the time for that, given
  • : progress is being made. don•t strain. publicly to convince people Douglas Dillon: -- spend time not on how we got into Viet Nam, but on po_sition we're in and real choices we face; -- clarify what we are doiug on the ground and in bombing; D ~~!:-1!:.0
  • TO VISIT. HE AGREEDSIMULTANEOUS ANNOUNCEMENT SEOULANDWASHINGTON AS SUGGESTED. . PRESIDENTIALSECRETARYSUGGESTSANNOUNCEMENT ON WEDNESDAYp FEB 24 (SEOUL TIME) AT AN HOURCONVENIENT TO WASHINGTON. I SAID ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD PROBABLY BE APPROXIMArELY AS FOLLOWS
  • with respect to the Indians is to buy time during which, hopefully, we can move forward on broader fronts to bring under more permanent control the dangers inherent in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. /s/ DeanRusk Dean Rusk •• ·CEIVED ~-os I 0\1'S
  • . Bundy said that . we would be discussing with Sato the problem of Japanese trade with Communist China and in that context we would also be noting the problem of trade with North Korea. The Pak Visit Ambassador Kim again raised the question of the timing
  • such authority in bilateral bargainning. The difference between Commerce and the rest of us is on timing and on the relation of this issue to Vietnam. The matter of timing is minor Jack Connor would like to have further "public education" before ~~~ .. blR in 1
  • ing for a long time. The President: The North Vietnamese made a pretty good bade. They get partial suspension of the bombing for merely sitting and talking in Paris. Under Secretary Katzenbach : The fate of the discussions in Paris turns
  • expressing concern over the recent ratification of the Korea-Japan normalization agreementso At the time of delivery, our Embassy thanked the messenger and stated that his letter would receive due consideration. Since the Embassy has already orally acknow­
  • , there is some evidence of admix­ ture with Malayan and Caucasoid strains. The only important minority group at the present time is the approximately 600,000 Koreans. There are also much smaller groups of Chinese and Caucasian residents. Religion Buddhism
  • in advance of presentation . 3. The U.S -. statement would include language designed to provide a basis in the public record for re-opening the queo?tion of verification at a future time should it become desirable to do so and for withdrawing if necessar y
  • , lnjurie• and material damage. I am also prof011Ddly arateful for the very important and timely help received from the United State• through your active Embaaey, which has contributed ao much to alleviating the depr•••ing aituatlon in the affected region
  • of NU-66 and the Honolulu Conference, a 29 minute video-swmnary of the politico-military games NU I and II-66 was presented a second time at the Pentagon and other interested on 24 March, for senior participants officials. Individual film showings were
  • the Pre ident: QOOTE: Dear Mr. Prime Ministert Your thoughtful tragic hot 1 fire letter the in Kingston last month both saddened and pleased me. caused by* regarding the fire. the loss I regret At the iame time I am very glad that our men
  • that end at"e feasible. 2. The passage of time, however, has necessitated certain changes in specific recommendations: 3.L/ lb>l 1, (,) a. Recommendation 1 (e) should be deleted. A shipborne test was conducted with unsatisfactory results. (The Department
  • ensuring full and timely support of the U.S. Mission in Saigon on matters within his purview. In accordance with established procedures, any instructions to the U.S. Mission in Saigon will be issued through the Secretary of State. In carrying out
  • !'\ a cable on this in the next few days which will go to you as a matter of -routine. However, I do want you to have this background with the bope that "you will find time on your busy schedule" to give it a lift. (Extract from letter from Chester
  • are allowing the almost wholly goverr...rnent-controlled media to feed the growing anti-US and pro-Chicom sen.thnent in Pakistan. Oux Embassy and USIA report' US prestige is at an all-time low. The risk here is that Ayub may paint himself into a corner
  • crisis, Moscow has appeared to recognize that the present balance of power is relatively unfavorable to it and will remain so for a long time. As a result, Soviet policy has been essentially d:!.rected toward keeping international ten s5.on within bounds
  • , the SIG has met with decreasing frequency during the last year. In the last six months of 1966, the SIG met three times and has met .-only twice in 1967. It is significant that it has taken no part in the conduct of our most serious and complicated
  • . should be prepared to pay for such agreements. security optimum c. How far it is in the U.S. interest to go in meeting Indian concerns, what form such action mi'~t take, and what the timing might be. d. Whether need to be pursued. there are other
  • MEMORANDUM Participants: Z3, 1967 OF CONVERSATION Abba Eban, Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Avraham Harman, Ambassador of Israel Ephraim Evron, Minister of Israel W. W. Rostow Harold H. Saunders Time: 11 a. m., October Z3,· 1967, in Mr. Rostow 1
  • Presidential decision on the substance of a programo I believe this is a realistic schedule which will make possible the timely and orderly considera­ tion by the President of the subjects covered by NSAM 335. This proposed schedule presents one difficulty