Discover Our Collections


  • Collection > National Security Files (remove)
  • Specific Item Type > Folder (remove)
  • Type > Text (remove)

Limit your search

Tag Contributor Date Subject Type Collection Series Specific Item Type Time Period

731 results

  • of the decision to make a reprisal strike only. The President: We need to know the ex-tent of the damage c aused by yesterday's strike . Thi s will have a bearing on future decisions. We should g ive considera ­ tion to Taylor• s recorrunendation but for the time
  • A R C H IV ES PRO C ESSIN G N O TE You w ill find two versions o f the document withdrawal sheets in th is file . The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many o f the documents have been
  • in the )bnthly Follow·up Report and have requested the Bureau o't Inter•Acierican Attairs to prepare a :pl'OSreB& report on these directive$·, from timo to time. However, in llsht ot recent developments, and the continuing high-level interest in a much changed
  • , but it is a day- to ­ day problem. The Greek Cypriots are trying to delay progress in order to throw the entire problem into the G eneral Assembly. Turkish military intervention becomes more difficult with the passage of time . Secretary Rusk : Dean Acheson has
  • the exercise called for by NSAM 298. Therefore, no formal reply is neces­ sary at this time. I suggest, however, that we circu­ late the draft response which has been prepared, so that it can be available for study. hi1 6McGeor DISTRIBUTION: Bell, AID McCone
  • . the argument Notably for a reserve after the experience minimal national at a time of isolation and extreme danger, some part persistence as a national in Britain's Aside from nuclear Washington, diplomacy it capabilities the argument did
  • of nickel, platinum, beryl ore, magnesium, and castor oil, all cur­ rently in short supply in the commercial market. 3. Accurate, comprehensive, and timely statistics are ~ential to the development of sound economic policies by government, business
  • continue to be valid, i.e., that it remains in the U.S. interest to develop alternatives to U.So facilities in Pakistan and that measures toward that end are feasible. 2o The passage of time, however, has necessitated certain changes in specific
  • through international or private a gencies, Secretary Rusk said it would be serious to pull out of the FAO. On the other hand, with American personnel coming out of countries like the UAR, voluntary a gency programs might have to give for the time being
  • talking in terms of March. Experience on other weapon systems indicates that there is usually some time lag between an initial operational capability and a dependable capability. Nevertheless, this interim detection system should be fully operational
  • ~ at any time for 1•ela.tively rapid deployment, our analyses c onclud~ that it would not impl'ove our st1·ategk offensive postl\l·e and const.que1\tly we ; have no intention of revising the decisio11 made years ago. _ , ,,i!-, ....., I,, .J ::,' I i
  • )' ).-11-Ko By ·1~ , NARS, Date GROUP 4 Do wng raded at 3 year in te rva ls; dec lassified after 12 years [Front] 1964 APR 30 PM 2 3R [Back] 0 v May 4, 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY Mac -It appears reasonable to give NASA a little more time
  • : FOUR WORDS) I WAS ABLE TO TELL HIM HOWMANY PEOPLE THERE WERE IN THE CREW Ai'JD THE FACT £1LJ,TWE NEEDED MEDICAL ATTENTION. THEY COMPLETELY CHOSE TO IGNORE THE REQUEST WE HAD FOR MEDICAL ATI'ENTION. AT THIS TIME HODGESWAS STILL BARELY ALIVE AND WE
  • assistance to Indonesia is in the U.S. national interest. In an amendment to the For eign Assistance Act,, Congress required the President to make such a deter mina tion ( see attached State Department pape r ) . Secretary Rusk said it was not a good time
  • use of of nucloar weapons. I confim that the Memorandum Understanding -enclosed viith your letter correctly reJresent,s the position of my Government. J"t the s~~a time I note your reference to the continuing validity of the underta.'d.ngs g1van
  • In the donor's deed of gift. NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION. NA FORM 1429 (8-86) -I ...... -..) a,. -.J NEW YORK TIMES Friday, December l, ATOM ARMS GAINS DESPITE TEST BAN I ACHIEVED BYU.&i JacksonTells of Advancesil FormerlyHeld
  • . Division Now Stationed in Korea Attached pursuant to your request in NSAM No. 298 is a coordinated State-AID-Defense study or a possible redeployment of' one or the two U.S. divisions now stationed in Korea. Appended to the study is a time-phased plan f'or
  • talks - combat President at any time. such troops 1968, peace. for that operations - forum a de-escalation revealed afterwards toward the 31st of March that the U.S. the next deployed these in the current was preparing five months
  • , and agrees that it is not feasible to have such plans to cover every case. At the same time, the report leaves unanswered a number of questions. There is enclosed herewith a copy of the principal comments of the representative of the Department of State
  • . At the same time, Afghanistan will remain deeply con­ cerned with the preservation of its independence and will continue to exercise its considerable skill in hedging Soviet influence. While probably already convinced that the US role will be a secondary one
  • Great Britain means to us -- and means to the world in which we live -- we are moved by a more meaningful English voice from the past. It was Robert Browning who spoke the truth for our time,. "My sun sets to rise again." Yes, these are difficult times
  • of President Chiari ( CJ,~ ) to the United States o We have been carrying these items in the lvbnthly Follow- up Report and have requested the Bureau of Inter- American Affairs to prepare a progress report on these directives from time to time . However
  • in time to allow him to give full consideration thereto before the scheduled events are to take place. ·The Review Committee is also directed to perform the functions specified in NSAM No. 269. . DECLASSIFIED . Authonty Ns e- . ?'1roPosz. · i. f
  • affecting a Plebiscite. C. District Political Patterns, Problems and People. D. Attitudes toward Affiliation. E. Timing and Terms of a Plebiscite. F. Preparation for a Plebiscite. G. Present and Post-Plebiscite Territorial Government. H
  • At Department's.suggestion I wi:thheld demarche this subject planned for December 3 but am now increasingly concerned over scant time remaining available to work out with GOP new arrange_ment covering period on and after January 1, 1964. Foreign Minister now at SC meeting
  • &ft &Dct·a1fJOelated rmde&r woapoo.• to Canadian buea aa aA -a1enda item 111 lhe US.Cana~ MlAl•terf.al Jola& Comnnuee cm Defo.uo on Juae ZS. It la undot'etood that the aovor~t ot Canada ha• no objecUon to CIJ,u lderatlon ot We Uem at thla time. z
  • Will assist the Secretary of' State in exploring problems of · procedure and timing connected with holding discussions with the .Soviet Union and in proposing for my consideration the channels which would be most desirable from our point of view
  • of the enlisted men's barracks at Qui Nbon. As of that time , o ne U.S. soldier was known to be dead, 20 injured, and 20 missing. Presumably, the missing soldie rs are bur ied under the rubble of the billet. Mr. McGeorge Bundy summarized the discussion
  • ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified
  • departments on complex overseas problems, and assure that no sector of the foreign front is neglected at a time of preoccupation with some overriding problem. [Department of State Bulletin, March 28, 1966, Vol. LIV, No. 1396] SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK'S
  • and diplomatic. I see a movement upward all the way . We should be escalating . Personally I would mine Haiphong at the same time and get the political flak over with. The President: I think that public approval is deteriorating , and that it will continue to go
  • . PRESIDENT: SUBJECT: 1.. Hainan Territorial Waters Rescue Operation Facts The Seventh Fleet would like to launch its rescue chopper from the Kearsage at 0400 its time (3-3/4 hours from now). It would take 45 minutes to get to the scene. They hope
  • are still basically the same as·those developed in 1952, at a time when substantial U. S. a.nd Allied forces and resources were engaged in Korea and therefore not available in Europe. Because of this history ·and-the size of the nuclear shield provided
  • of our effort in the south. (This last sounds like an effort to have it both ways.) 2. I continue to be a strong believer in a December pause, and of course the time is getting shorter every minute. Rusk and McNamara and I plan to review this matter
  • in Cuba would undoubtedly result in the transmittal to these other countries of the methods of dealing with the EC M . In addition , there may come a time when we have a critical ne ed to look at a SAM - defended site. If we use the ECM now, we would thr
  • Tuesday night, because we are accepting Secretary Rusk's judgment that there are enough activities going on to make it prudent to wait until that time before you speak. We rejected the idea of a personally delivered message to Congress because proposed
  • CONVERSATION I MENTIONED THAT AGREEMENT COtJTINIJED TO BE HELD UP ON ~ATTERS I HM) ~ffNTIONED EARLIER BUT THAT THESE MIGHT BE RESOLVED AT ANY TIME AND IF so -I"WOULD TAKE THE . LIBERTY OF MAKING DIRECT CO~TACT WITH THE PRIM~ MINISTER IF THERE SHOULD
  • this the approach is not likely leaders At the same time, security needs, to deter an Indian nuclear weapons program indefinitely. 4. Possibility of a "Peaceful" Explosion. other· immediate issue worth noting at this S~&IMITED ... There is one time
  • . At the present time, the situation in the Khe Sanh area is quiet. No enemy contacts have been reported in the area since the attack on at 6:25 PM EST, the details of which are Hill 861 ended yesterday described in the succeeding paragraphs. 2. At 3:00 PM EST
  • leaders that there was no need for our country to develop a FOBS system. While develop­ ment of it could be initiated at any time for relatively rapid deployment, our analyses conclude that it would not improve our strategic offensive posture