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  • Service Institu teo . About 1050 had had a 20-bour famili- zation course at a military base 0 th,e Since arriving at their LIMITED OFFICIAL USE Lll~ITED OFFICIAL USE .- 3 - overs eas post~ where t hey wil l t ypi cally spend 29 months, about
  • ~ in a language envir-;:,nment: for~lgn Wiv~a in Foreign ~n_gu~s~ Stat~ Defense Average ReBidence 'a:I. Post A?proximate ·Aver.ag~ Am1tl.al Rotation ...... .......,..._ 3i540 34 months 1,239 930 37 months 298 3,100 41 months 899 montha 5211278 34
  • , all posts except London and Paris origi­ nally were instructed not to divulge any information prior to April 4 , the date of the passage through the Malacca Strait. London and Paris were instructed to inform the British and French Governments inunedi­
  • of the people that are trying to make sure that we take a good 'hard look at what we commit ourselves to post-MC 26/4. If you feel that this exceeds the scope of the President 1 s approval, we can either drop it entirely, in which case you can sign at the bottom
  • Objectives established at your direction by NSAM No.321 on December 1, 1964, to review strategic stockpile objectives and post-nuclear attack planning. The Committee, chaired by the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and consisting
  • ning Areas 13 - 20 Sep 66 66 cmcPAc FORCES PURPOSE BRIEF DESCRIPTION d Post E.xerc1e . rov de ata wh ch y be used o evaluate and increase th op r t1onal cap b111ty of th par1clpati co ands . SAC/NORAD/ADC/RCAF To tam1lar1ze co l US Corpe (Gp
  • military and civilian) who are about to occupy important posts in underdeveloped countries. It is the wish of the President that key military and civilian per­ . sonnel assigned to positions of responsibility at posts within Latin America, Africa, the Near
  • WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES) FORM OF DOCUMENT CORR ESPON DENTS O R TITLE s DATE RESTRICTION lp If ,, 114 meme- s lp - eptei lo All Pl!, AF, NEA Posts, USUN (ElFaft) - --C 6p - ~ 3-?-'i'f /VLJ 93- 3~1 4114-f~--+---'flr' FILE
  • are at Iquitos, and units are posted about in small popu­ lation centers of the area. An Army Recruit Training Center, one of five in Peru, annually trains several thousand conscripts drawn from the surrounding area. The Army conscript training includes literacy
  • . In case you missed it, I have attached the Post's account of Harriman' s appearance which apparently is a trIB account of wbat actually happenedo Sam Belk Atchmt - a/ s THE WASHINGTON POST -- February 21, 1964
  • Service should also be responsible for surveillance Of buildings around the White House vhich might be used as possible listening posts. 4. ·Efforts should be made to obtain a highl.y qualified technical director for the countermeasures program
  • collect and refine this ittfcmnation n . xt year. With regard to future cou.rau of action, the Department report muat be considered as interim. An airgratu bas been sent to our AJnbaaaadora at about 90 posts on July 12, requesting sugguticma aa to 1'how
  • in­ tegration and the thaw in Eastern Europe .. e. French Policy. A review of U.S.· policy toward Gaullist and post-de Gaulle France, focusing on third areas as well as Europe. f. Insurgency in Vietnam and Laos. Feasibility of U.S. and GVN actions
  • . Diplomatic posts overseas. The system provides communi­ cations service for a number of civilian agencies and certain military components located at foreign service posts. NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION OPERATED NETWORKS/ SYSTEMS a. Description
  • affecting a Plebiscite. C. District Political Patterns, Problems and People. D. Attitudes toward Affiliation. E. Timing and Terms of a Plebiscite. F. Preparation for a Plebiscite. G. Present and Post-Plebiscite Territorial Government. H
  • security protection of sensitive US sites, we should institute closed areas which are locally posted as being off limits to unauthorized personnel. This would effecti vely bar access to all potential intelligence collectors, not merely to certain-Official
  • expected on issues of E~st-West trade. However, the UNCTAD did resolve that )fforts to remove administrative, economic and trade-policy obst-:L~les to such trade should be continued "in whatever available forums", incJ ti Jing the post-UNC'I'AD machinery
  • Mr. Powers Maj Odor M.r . West Sft. Ellie S,t. Stadt Sgt. Mapn SMaj R.uaaell Mrs. Lincoln Sllaj Waybrant Ki•• Crucioli Sllaj Putterman -Maj Cro•• -S gt• ..Antiaezzi Maj lta1lalld Mr. Palmer llr. Secor Loui•.l ana ~..U, taos So Post
  • vitally concerned, particularly members involved in a significant COl)lF ID~~NTil\.L .: CONFIDENT!~ -8- a significant .difference of opinion in the draft papero After appropriate consultation with the field post concerned through the geographical
  • China. The post-Nehru leadership could be far more pro-US than Nehru. These are big stakeso And if we go ahead with India, we also want to protect our flank with the Paks. You could either have a meeting or, in view of inter-agency agreement, just sign
  • be so nice Que~: Is there anything worth watching or promoting in East-est relations which might transform that post-Sep ­ tember prospect? Of course,. all the foregoing is without benefit of reading cables for two weeks - .... or knowledge of what
  • . Informally this point is being made whenever the opportunity arises in talks with both official and non-official South Africans here and at our posts in South Africa. Consideration of additional measures · such as higher level approaches will be reser'Ved
  • explosions by control posts located outside the Soviet Union. Within perhaps nine to twelve months the a n alysis and integration of this research may have reached the point where new u.s. proposals might be possible. In past negotiations for a comprehensive
  • believes Israel would continue to press for missiles, but perhai:-s rr!ore slowly. · Higli.llghts f'rcm the comments_of our posts follow: · ;. l. !].giers: Th~ Israeli tank transaction woUld maY.e the .A lgerians even less disposed to list~n to U.S. advice