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  • to Chamizal. The film ill in the Theater ready for you to see when you wish. Bill Bowdler has viewed it and says it ia a first-class job. thinks it could be useful with many different audiences: Bill the Latin American ambassadors, the next time you have
  • available to you at 11 o'clock 2 In accordance with our policy, the units earmarked for deployment in Southeast Asia will not be identified until they arrive there at their location. No decision has been made at this time as to whether forces
  • CLIFFORD: Yes. The understanding, which of course, was of a general nature, in Paris, was that the DMZ would not be violated because we felt we could not go on with the talks which we hoped at that time would start promptly, if the DMZ were violated. Now
  • . We have eucb. a. vlalt wid•r coiualde~ation. Proa.. idem Frei ls awa•e or my de•lre that he cor.ne to the tJnlted..States· at a mutually coi,veatant time. The place u4 date to~ the proposed mee·Ung ot Atneri.can P:Naidenta will qu.tte uturally hav•e
  • time a.ad i• therefore ln a poor pealtion to crltlctze a slnsl• Air :Force error, however tragic lt ta for those who were hit. McG . .B . May 4, 1965 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT The attached memora.Ad.um has been done by Butch Fisher ove7 the last
  • made on this group. McCloy stated he had this not from beer-drinking lobbyists but from first-rate people. The conversation occurred just before the news conference and I did not have time to find out just whom he was quoting. n, "'· McG. ($ , B
  • this week and to be here over the weekend of 28-30 August. I can decide about Labor Day when the time comes. 4. Unless you object, therefore, I will plan to get out of here tomorrow morning and then be here through the last weekend of August. This involves
  • SETTLEMENT AND - SUPERVISION.OF PEACEARRANGEMENTS. HE HADESTABLISHED A tlORKING GROUP 'IHICH 2. DO SAlD'-THAT WAS MEC:TING SEVERAL TIMES A •,EEK WITH HIM TO DISCUSS 'poss18LE POSITIONS FOR GVN to TAK! It~ SUBSTA~tTIVE TALKS. HE SHOVED POLITICALCOUNSELOROUTLIN
  • . 'I'he-appear.;ance given was that Moscow was willing at last· ... to give the-Czechs-•preslll)1ably chastened by. the~ nearness of their approach to the brink--a .. , respite. ~fuai;_went on i1\ Czechoslovakia duri~g the short span of time since Cierna
  • ; at a critical time you served with 1reat die­ tlnction ae our Ambaaeador to Brazil; you have driven forward the Alliance for Progress over the past years with marked eucceas. As you leave to take up your post 1n Baltimore. the Alllance for Pros.,.ees le ho
  • . a. ( 1S- T HE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON August 22, 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT Subject: Halleck's remarks on the Gulf of Tonkin timing On August 11, in the House, Char lie Halleck made the following statement: "As I remember it -- and I have checked
  • Ambassador Dobrynin of this fact and said that now we were prepared to compromise on one and a ha,lf of the three points. It was time for them to clear this underbrush away. At this point Dobrynin volunteered the following. He had been privileged to get
  • ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified
  • • .__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ At the same time, however. we &1:-e getting a more modern stockpile better tailored to apecified military miaaiona. 4. The recommended a ~ i l e is within the projected availability of special nuclear materials, and the amnber of new weapons la within AEC
  • patrol boats. We have made· quite · clear that ·t he· PUEBLO was on an intelligence collection mission in· the Sea of Japan at the time of its seizure by North Korea. Intellig~--ice collec.tion .by vessels of this type is a standard and accepted
  • affirmative response of the United States to the proposal of the Secretary General of August 16, 1965 (which we have never surfaced) at which time the Secretary General called for "a return to the essentials of the Geneva Agreement. 11 Ambassador Goldberg also
  • David LJ.U.atlaal'• reactl• to the yoaa1 ecoaoml.t• aad cabl-t mlaletera be met. T'My are al ao put of the new poap; aad I aupect you. caa flad men like them la every prmace. 6. Tbarefore. I wauld aot accept at tlli• time, 011 preHat e.S.dltace
  • to use larger, better armed units to combat the Revolutionary Development program. 13. The Enemy -- the US. Some of these ~olitical develop- ments in Saigon as well as the trends on the battleground have been apparent for some time. Thus, in order
  • dac.ls:k tn. l h=Gpe that yoa ·w lll atso devote time and $1ergy to get Pre-1.ddenta. 1 attd caolnet .m .bd,ter&., eeng~es.s«~a and civic leada-ra to oap.tu.re the eeaae of miaeion, whlch ou:r A1Uan.¢e needs and to pass it down the line. -- The ••c.c;e
  • was given oral approval at that time. In that memorandum, I stated that additional U.S. assistance not to exceed $4-6 million might prove necessary, based on the self-help perform­ ance requirements in connection with this emergency assistance. Following
  • ; but we shall consult closely and regularly. a psyw~r If n:egotiations--start, the GVN ,--wi.th-~-help,~~- ~h:
  • or North that is that in South Viet Nam concurrently b) What indications ( End FYI Other specific to furnish time? DRV formulation bombin~fl FYI Usual bombing would be of bombin~ would be taken up at the talks? was H~nci's ics stopping
  • .' MAJ{E DECISION THIS WEEJ{END - TO S"!R!XE'. MAIN HOPE .I SEE or· AVOIDING · SUCH'DECISIOW ,IS FOR IM MEDI AT! INTERIM ACTION WHICH WILL BUY .TIME. ·_., IT -WAS~-FOR THIS REASON I HAVE SUGGESTED · TELEPHONICALL\' CERTAIN ':·srEPS SE . PUT"- Hl" TP.AIN
  • ~ ~~ ,,,...,. Barbados is scheduled to become ind, ~ ndent November 30. The State ,/ Department recommends (Tab A)"that the United States recognize the Government of Barbados at that time, and that you authorize establish­ ment of an Embassy, headed by a resident
  • Ambassador Kemal Bob Anderson has filled me in on his talks with Nasser and his subsequent talks with the UAR Ambassador; Kemal. He ·tells me that Kemal three times repeated to him his view that one of the great constructive elements in US/UAR relations
  • and to provide the items and dollar amounts of thle asehtance. The Department ha• concluded that release at thh time of certain of the information of the kind reque ■ted would be prejudicial to the defen ■ e lntere ■h of the United States and that the non-dleclo
  • . . .. . . . . . . ADDITIONAL BAT'l'Al~lONS OF 1·1-m HHST AN]) HILT.. BE PREPARED TO DEPLOY A 'l'~!!RD BA'f'l'AL!ON H:C1'!i A BRJ:GADE HEI\DQ.UAR'£Er{s A'£ A L/(rER . TIME. IN HY O?IN!ON, rus IS '£HE MlNlMUM l'ORCE "fBi\'f I t{tLL Nr:ED TO INSURE
  • the first time wo~ld mean an estimated 300-500 ci,.dl ian casualties in the initial assaults. The irnpact · o•f this action on Hanoi 1 s capacity .to infiltrate materiel into lhe So~th would be entir~ly through the load placed on the i~port' trahsportation
  • . In comparison, during February, at the height of the northeast monsoon, only three percent of the total effort was expended in Route Package 6-A and three percent in 6-B. At the same time, 64 percent was flown in Route Package l during February versus 37 percent
  • conflicts~ corners of of the 11 that and wonderful Unit~d wars, and quarrels conferences for eartho century international the and 11 States curing From good kept of time aloof from It Europeo correcting uLrest faith
  • attache General Walters (who are very close to Castelo Branco) are following up on this and although it is clear that Castelo faces a bigger and harder political problem than Harriman and I thought possible, Gordon and Walters think that in time a Branco
  • revolution. During this time, the country has experienced many difficulties and changes, which ~ have consumed a great deal of energy. Nevertheless, these four long years full of challenges in fighting and building, have been useful to us in choosing a path
  • the matter oa theae 1rounda: 1. Suffldent time ha• elapaed lldnce premature diacloaure of the propoaal before yea bad a chance te couider lt. l. The appropriation for our partidpatioa ta the OAS apecUlcally cover ■ co■ta of the ml ■■loa ao tut what la
  • • of fial ■ hed weapoaa, aad at ladla and Paki ■ taa to d~lop their own the ■ame time -coura1• w•poaa-mekt•1 facillti••• He wW al■ o ar111e that we ahould pall om all the •top■ oa the Hill to 1•t ladla excepted from the Come Arn•ndmeat (wlaldl reqalr•• ua
  • America'• aympathy for CncboalovaJda in a D.Clll-political and American ■ ettiag. W. W. Roatow ---- Speak to Jim Jones tentati•ely about a time No ---- Speak to me _ _ __ -· ·•:i~" . ·· • ,. • , ~ T0 B~ :'\}.! f..Dt
  • to establish a relationship between this reported regiment and one of those believed deploying; however, the coinci_dence in time points toward such a relationship. Each of the deploying and the divisional anti"'.'aircraft divisions battalion is possibly
  • cempllcated world. Then are bou.ad to be mom.at• of crl1l• aDd coafllct. la the paat week a crl•l• h.a• arl••• la Korea. "It l• aataral at •wch a time that men ahoald •llould wODder whether the crl•l• cOllld a■k q•nloaa; f:IMty ha•• beea avoWed. whether
  • BY THE INCONSISTENCY.· OF ·' SEEKING ENTRY INTO TiiE -· cot1MON MARKET' At ·:·THE'. SANE TIME THEY WERE THREATENING !O ~ITHDRAW TROOPS FROt1 THE: 'CONTINENT• THE · uK WOULD THEREFORE .. LIKE IO ARRIVE AT A SITUATION WHER~ THE GAP WOULD &E COVERED ..so THEY WOULD Nor
  • The White House A~ ~ -- From: Orville L. Freem Secretary of Agriculture Subject: Food for Freedom -- P.L. 480 -- Executive Order Wear~ conducting a careful talent search to find a man to recommend to you as requested. Pl.ease give us a little time