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  • , what should we do? We shouldn't be doing anything that ha..s a on~in-three chance. Perhaps a cease-fire in place. Not now. It takes time. d,., ·-:i / 4f
  • resolution but we will need additional time beyond that." The President said he should tell the Congress that previous Presidents rave asked for temporary, limited taxing powers. This was always denied. Now the question should be raised to the Democratic
  • . Personally I would mine Haiphaig at the same time and get the political flak over with. The President: I think that public approval is deteriorating, and that it will continue to go down. Some in Congress are disgusted about the Buddhist uprising
  • &l-Yc j)c ft , NARS, Date 4 =4-~ :.t\uthonty By; Meeting in President's Office Date: January 29, 1966 Time: 12:45 (a. m. or p. m. not specified) Present: President, Vice President, Rusk, Goldberg, Bundy, Moyers, and Valenti (From notes
  • '.Vier. - 3 ­ The President then summarized saying that actually there are only three for us. Goldberg said he wanted to take exception to a statement made by Secretary Rusk that there will be a future time to go to the United Nations
  • , but most of the time was spent talking about rice production, graft, corruption, cleaning up the local situation..• 11 The President said he was glad to hear that Marcos was friendly, because he had heard bad reports. Speaker McCormack mentioned his radio
  • , that they are expecting us to hit the air field any time we go into that area. Secretary Rusk said that we should not keep referring to targets being shifted from one list to another. Everytime we hit a new target, there is a notion around the world
  • today which I wasnt aware of. Some of Bernie's organizational work -- his timing -- has caused problems. Today the Attorney General issued a report which he simplified for me. (sheet attached. ) I will be number one or two or three, or whatever you want
  • in order to allow time for a motion to be programmed to instruct the conferees to report back a $4 billion reduction. The Speaker and Carl will find someone to make this motion if the approach is agreeable to Wilbur Mills. Albert thought that we should
  • brief the Cabinet on this history and allow time for questions and answers. He asked. Joe Califano to take charge of this operation. Fifth, the President also asked Joe Califano to coordinate a staff study of what can be done to develop specialized
  • and verse.) Presid-ent: When you go to Sharp, Bob, tell him we are thinking along t...""lese possibilities -- and get their views:. Rusk: Tragedy about -situation is that Fulbright statement urging extending the pau..se and recognizing the Viet Cong. Times
  • ) wants to wait. I asked him if he c".uld deliver VC if I ga.ve him more time . He couldn't answer. Rusk: But the central policy issue is err.barrassment over some thin issue -­ r11cNa.r~a.~a : to D~2..:: Ne can:t start before F riday their time
  • of National Secui-ity Council Date: (Not specified but believe it was January 30, 1966 Time: 12:15p.m. to2:25p.m. check) Present: President, Vice President, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Rusk, McNamara, Wheeler, Fowler, Mac Bun::ly, Bill Bundy, Goldberg, Marks
  • Room Date: March 11, 1966 Time: 12:35 to 1:30 p.m. Present: President, Rusk, McNamara, Vance, Wheeler, Komer, Gardner, Marks, Helms, Raborn, Bell, Ball, Bromley Smith, General Goodpaster, J. Valenti (Fro:n notes by J. Valenti) Goodpaster: March 4
  • -a./ , - -- NAlC'.', Date_!L_l J.2 SECRET ­ -2­ Arthur Dean and General Bradley spent a good deal of their time on the domestic situation and how to present the story of the war in ways which would encourage our people to unify and stay the course. Dean cited
  • ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified
  • to say but when Podgorny was here he told me that Russia would never abandon the cause of North 5. Vietnam. I tried to convince him that this was the proper time to collaborate with the U.S. in peace moves but I received negative results. Is there some
  • : Walt and Bus will explain what is happening. GENERAL WHEELER: Starting at midnight their time, we had a number of attacks, mostly airfields, also city of Kontum. Information we have is that the attack in Danang area was light. But Chu Lai
  • offshore. (Tab A} The Vietnamese have, at various times, advanced the claim that the entire Gulf of Tonkin was a closed area, i.e., territorial waters. No major maritime state has acknowledged this claim. The map showing the precise track of the first
  • concerrsabout early political moves to obtain a negotiated settlement (paragraphs 4c and 9) were recorded in footnotes. Ambassador Lodge emphasized that his concern with respect to political moves was basically on the matter of timing. He also felt that channels
  • days after Peking 1 s broadcast castigating Thant as a U.S~ errand boy. He emphasized too the sharp divisions in the leadership in Hanoi, .::s reported particularly by Dier, Canadian ICC member. The Secretary Gener~l noted that for the first time Hanoi
  • confer­ ence tried to put to rest the division - put Ky in charge of Civil Defense. Ky will preside over several councils, and Ky was very pleased. They're conferring together two or three times a day. I've always thought it was manageable. Ky would like
  • FOR THE MEETING DID NOT COME AT A TIME .WHEN THE WHITE HOUSE SEEMED TO THINK THE THREAT OF A SOVIET INVASION OF RUMANIA WAS EASING, SAID, "I WOULD ~ NOT COMMENT AT ALL ON THAT." CHRISTIAN SAID THE MEETING WILL BE A "REVIEW SESSION OF A NUMBER OF THINGS." I I I
  • made it clear that he and General Westmoreland were in agreement on this question of timing. The President indicated that he had gained the impression in an earlier talk with Ambassador Taylor that the Government now might in fact be somewhat
  • - l August 5, 1967 NOTES OF MEETING OF PRESIDENT WITH MEL ELFIN, NEWSWEEK: JOHN STEELE OF TIME: JACK SUTHERLAND OF U.S. NEWS, JULY 28, 1967 The President had a general discussion with these three magazine writers on the Detroit riot and civil
  • would take it if we would add in the Senate bill. Carl Albert said we would have a hard time selling that to the House. The President said it would be easier to ame nd in the S enate than make e ach of the cuts in the House. Albert asked if anyone has
  • I MEMORANDUM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON NOTES ON INFORMAL COFFEE IN THE FAMILY DINING ROOM - JANUARY 31, 1968 Present: The President George Christian ~ Hugh Sidey - Time Carroll Kilpatrick - Washington Post Merriman Smith - UPI Frank
  • give considera­ tion to Taylor's recommendation but for the time being, we should approve a strike by the South Vietnamese only. Bomb damage assessment flights by U.S. planes should be flown. Secretary McNamara, turning to the question of withdrawing
  • unable to get the Hanoi people to even consider negogiations at this time. Thus, we were forced to keep our pressure up until talks could begin. He promised that he would personally transmit this view and the memo to the Holy Father along with his
  • cities was also cited as a step toward improvement of urban areas . "We now have pending $7 billion in city programs . little time until we can rebuild our cities." This gives a Harding Lawrence of Braniff commented t:rat the President's friends wanted
  • ; N~C . :·;:.l~S, Date /'?-~~-(/ C ll-5 - l'J - 2 ­ General Wheeler: From the time the Pueblo was seen on the 22nd, they went back and laid on it. Secretary McNamara: Maybe from the 10th. Secretary Katzenbach: They waited until they got
  • Rusk: Do we want to warn Hanoi on the consequences of an attack on Saigon? 'l'he President: Yes, we ought to tell them to give these talks a chance to succeed. After we've stopped the bombing all this time and they hit Saigon, what kind
  • checking showed there were as many as 3,800 Americans in the Dominican Republic. A memo of the correct figures is attached. This information was not available at the time Secretary Rusk spoke. Buzz -- -· D E ~ I. /.~~·::-· 1FTED ·~ Autlirirify __ t
  • side understands the problem. Col. Sam Wilson also good. Plans to concentrate in 4 limited priority areas. If they accomplish this, they will have affected I /20 or 1 /10 of rural population but it will be first time this has happened. Key question
  • in uninhabited area of Cambodia used for North Vietnam retreat.) Secretary Rusk: I need time to think about it -- especially B-52s. General Wheeler: I don't need a decision for several days. to have it Monday or Tuesday. I would like Secretary Clifford: I see
  • bombing, to see if the talks in fact become serious. If they attack across the DMZ or attack the cities, then we could resume at any time according to the conditions we have put to them. On the other hand, Secretary Rusk pointed out there would be costs
  • CARROLL, LONDON SUNDAY TIMES October 5, 1967 Mr. Carroll: I have been here eight days, and the thing that has struck me is the popularity charts showing the trends in public support of the President and his policies. At what point do you decide
  • DURATIOtl OF COlYJBAT . ON THE ORDEfl OF FIVE TIMES WHAT :iE NOW HA S~·. IF HE SHOULD DEVELOP THIS, IT WOULD, IN. MY JUOG."1ENT9 MAKE OnR POSITIONS ·IN NORTHERN QUANG TRI CTO INCLUDE DONG HA AND THE CUA VIET> UNTENA!LE. I CAm10t AGREE TO PLACE OUR FORCES
  • should go to Vietnam. Lucey also paid tribute to the "fine type of military men." He said they were just magnificent and it is just terrible that these men are called murderers. "This isn't the time to lie about the United States." - 3 ­ Rabbi P. Rudin
  • that there had been little time for discussion, He wished those present to speak frankly and give their best judgment even though they would be hearing for the first time of the new developments. Walt Rostow: is as follows: The background in the current status