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  • CONG QUESTIONED BY BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN OF NATIONAL POLICE. BUT LOAN WAITED THREE OR FOUR DAYS BEFORE RELAYING THE INFORMATION , VICE PRESIDENT KY CKEE> HIS MENTOR. KY RELAYED THE INFORMATION TO PRESIDENT THIEU , WHO REPORTEDLY , S ANGERED
  • , IN WRITINe, T.HE POLICY OF THE US AND VIETNAMESE '3CVER NMENTS. . ·· 3. IMP~E:SSION OF KY AS LE.~DER AND HUMAN ~:!NG IS UNIVERS.~LL Y GOOD. HIS PRESS CONFERENCE AND GENERAL D::~~E:A~!()~ MAD~ DEE? AND L.~srnm Ir1PRESSION. ~013L~:~ AS I SEE IT ON VP TRIP
  • a communist takeover at the Assembly. Rostow: Government has President: not been credible. Why and how? Rostow: Ky was going to call a group to draft a constitution - - and hasn't done so. President: Rostow: What are problems in calling it? Not getting
  • . Once research done: In other emergency periods-- isn't our position much better overall, economic, etc., than in other such periods. On Vietnam: 1. Make every effort to keep Ky. But be ready to make terrible choice. Perhaps take a stand in Thailand
  • province chiefs and will be putting in more, increased taxes by decree and put tax bill to the assembly, ten draft laws on various subjects, closed black market and bars and nightclubs. He and Ky are working together better. On April 2 their joint press
  • Authority who is good man. Through the coming year need to take series of steps which will improve the port. Can't be done now because of administrative set up. Recommedd Ky establish a single-headed Port Authority - - put tough guy in charge. Put high
  • to divide off Ky. Secretary Rusk: He's taking wait and see attitude. Director Helms: It is dangerous - Ky keeping his generals close to see if Thieu goes too far. The President: Should Ky come here with Thieu? about it. Ask Bunker to think Secretary Rusk
  • toward representative government, etc.; {f) encourage unity of Directorate and promote reconciliation between Generals Ky and Thi; (g) encourage candidate qualification language that would disqualify "agents of a foreign power 11 or other terms rather
  • asked for the President 1 s . views of comments on the Hill that were critical of the Thieu-Ky attitude toward the South Vietnam elections. The President said some mistakes were being made, but that we might be surprised there were not more. Even in our
  • that is the case, why don't we sit down with Ky and tell him. McNamara: Because it would leak. We haven't told the U.S. people. Rusk: I think we'll see a drop in morale if we don't resume. Ky told me we talk about their country without telling them
  • . The President said he hopes they (Thieu and Ky) show action even though all the election returns are not in yet and even though they have not been inaugurated. The President said "instead of Dzu taking the headlines, Thieu and Ky should fill the news
  • , it isn't the best place for R. C. {presum ~bly Red China) either. ·westrnoreland is great soldier. Backed by high caliber civilian team. Thie u a ~d Ky are men of high l~ adership. Don't know how long th~y'll survive. Thes e r:ie n a re t r ying to d o wha
  • in Saigon is signed on -- they are getting to Ky now. This evening the Vietnamese - will be making a statement. It's a good statement. Having urged this on them, I wouldn't want to take the play away from them. I can't say anything tomorrow. If we have
  • with Thieu. By the end of June Thieu and Ky had agreed that this was the best practical way to proceed. In July, Vance spelled out the your-side, our-side formula to Lau. Nothing came of it, however, at that time. In mid-September the President, through
  • people see Cha.val. President: Rusk: Chaval made some statements, didn't he. Yes, but it was out of context. Rusk: In Korea, Formosa, Thailand, there was some worry about their security. President: How did Ky take it. Rusk: · He took it well when Lodge
  • on that recommendation." ~~~~W~=~~----------------------~· The President asked what is happening in Vietnam. Rusk replied "we are getting·~Thieu and Ky working together now, and that is the primary concern. " The President said "we should get Bunker to get them to put
  • back in six months. South Vietnam was concerned about this, but I thought we had to show that we were not colonizers and we were only interested in self-determination. At Manila, Ky accepted this. It was a Clifford plan. The President continued
  • never to talk to the "Thieu-Ky clique/' was now prepared to acknowledge the reality of the GVN. This means that there can be no settlement in Vietnam without the assent of the GVN. We have always said that there would be no problem in having the views
  • . "They came in freely and they voted freely." He said the problem now is one of unification and he did not know if Thieu and Ky are up to it. They are schooled in the authoritarian tradition, Muskie said. James Antell, National Jaycee President, said
  • is an intelligent and a reasonable fellow, and more balanced than Ky. He could go through the background of the conflict, the importance of the conflict, and I think this would be very helpful. Colonel Robin Olds, who is our only· air ace, could be assigned to speak
  • impression of General Ky, and his belief that the present GVN would be removed by the end of the year. General Wheeler stated that he had a good impression of General Thieu. He felt that the stability of the present government would depend on our support
  • . Then the tourists started coming into North Vietnam. It took us 37 days to get back in business between the tourists, after nothing came of the pause. More Sa\ \C -3­ "Now we have got some new jags this year - - neutralize the area, remove the Ky dictatorship
  • not be anticipated. lb traced development of the democratic process in Vietnam, said when Geno Ky took second-place on the Thieu­ 1
  • '~ th! ti llrw cuu~"t da Ltd s. \'le u1115t sh11w that arr: not . in with Ky•s ohJt:Ct1ve to invade H\JIL \'I~ ~re ·h uildins .s"~h a- fore~ that HVN mi~ht" thinK that is what we ace tr~ing - &o do. Rerne.1nbe{'" th Is ••or. - ta NV1~ 11 mov~errt l
  • requirements = total consumption minus local production. - 2 ­ 6. At this point my preference for strategy follows: a. Make clear to Thieu and Ky that we wish maximum progress before the election but that we ,expect the new GVN to take early
  • AS POSS I --- . :: • ', _ ·~·; -: .:; t THIEU :.rnsT 2;z GIVE !'~ TPi!: TO INFORM VP KY, !iUO.·:J , :: L:DEFEi1SE AND POSSI SL Y O,JE O;( T~..'O OTHt:FS, SHORTL Y BE17 0R~ OUi~" .~c:r:::.: ::r.:co:.•--:s J(!.1()1·.' :.: , SD TH t~ T T:·iEif~ FULL