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  • Collection > LBJ Library Oral Histories (remove)
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  • Contributor > Califano, Joseph A., 1931- (remove)

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  • I want to ask you about in connection with the [Mike] Mansfield memo and that was a statement by General [Nguyen Cao] Ky that the U.S. should do the fighting on the perimeter where the South Vietnamese army would fight or do more organizing in rear
  • ://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh Califano -- XVIII -- 7 G: Any insights on other potential successors to Stevenson? [Mike] Mansfield, [William] Scranton and [Eugene] McCarthy were all mentioned as possibilities. C: Well, Mansfield was, by this time
  • on this thing, "We are in a war and although all of you know my position on that war, I will not be a part of anything which weakens the morale of our men over there. We must live up to what I consider to be a matter of trust." [Mike] Mansfield said that they'd
  • , and then, I noticed from my diary, and I do remember Alan Boyd was a little chilly at that signing ceremony. Then we take [Mike] Mansfield and we went over to the East Room and I don't know whether that was a ceremony. I can't figure it out from these diaries
  • to say that he shouldn't recommend the surtax. I was at that breakfast. And he went around the table and he asked everybody and they all said, "Don't recommend it." [Mike] Mansfield, [John] McCormack, [Thomas Hale] Boggs, whoever. It came to Teddy, who
  • [with] the airlines at eighty-five million, Siemiller and the union at 115 million. That we have the Morse resolution and [Mike] Mansfield says the Morse bill is going to pass. And we talk about the strategy on the Morse bill and I explain that we've got to get
  • : Speeches and things like that. C: Yes, for people to deliver on the floor, and here's Manatos, knowing that the President would be looking for those speeches the next day, covering himself by saying, "I went up to see Senator [Mike] Mansfield about
  • the election--was [Senator Mike] Mansfield's base. But everything, he viewed everything as something to use. I just think--it's not related to this but while I think of it, [Nicholas] Katzenbach came by to see me one day to tell me that he was about to let
  • able to do that. Also on the Board--and I guess he was on by that point in time--the chairman of the board [was] John Mahan. Was it? G: M-A-H-A-N. C: Mahan was [Mike] Mansfield's guy. So I think knowing he had a board set up like that when he
  • , and at that point it became clear that the only thing we could do was ask for some kind of an extension--thirty days was what [Carl] Albert had suggested, I notice here--and recommend some final disposition of this thing at the end of that extension. [Mike
  • the power of the comptroller general. Whatever we decide to do, we've got to get the leadership, [Mike] Mansfield and [Everett] Dirksen, the Senate leadership, and the committee chairman aboard. And ended by saying, "Whatever you do"--it was another weekend
  • the President. He would also impound funds that we really didn't have to spend. Fowler said that rather than suspend the investment tax credit, he would rather have a corporate tax increase, and the President told him to go see Carl Albert, Mike Mansfield
  • . As a general rule I think the answer would be yes. But I think, you know, a [Everett] Dirksen or a [Mike] Mansfield would have a lot more influence than just a senator. But I think Johnson was pretty sensitive about all those sort of courtesy issues. As I said
  • at the same time we had 14(b) on the floor of the Senate. And ultimately, although I see here [that] between the President and his immediate staff, we called sixty-one senators on 14(b), we could not break a filibuster. And [Mike] Mansfield finally in late
  • , and with Mike Mansfield, who was still hanging on when I was in the White House, I forget, to some town in Montana [with] a big air force base. But the only one in which somebody came along and made a pretty damned good case that we'd made a mistake
  • --an array of option papers were going over to Bundy. Now that I look at this I see that also even in June [Mike] Mansfield, even in June Mansfield obviously sensed that the President didn't know what he wanted to do and was resisting pressure to go. My
  • book here to [Senator Everett] Dirksen and [Senator Mike] Mansfield and others were more related to [Robert] Weaver in the Department of Housing and Urban Development than to this. I don't think I spent much LBJ Presidential Library http
  • a recollection of Bobby Kennedy particularly trying in some way to force us to publicly take a stand for Morse and against labor. These are just senators I'm obviously talking to: [Everett] Dirksen, [Mike] Mansfield. End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview XXXV
  • , about a bill relating to the reserves and the fact that he wanted to have a legislative leaders' meeting when he got back. I just can't find--oh yes, we did, on Tuesday. We had a congressional breakfast with the Vice President, [Mike] Mansfield, [Russell
  • , particularly including Mike Mansfield. So, the bill was passed late in the session. If the President had moved relatively promptly with Weaver, he would have run into a lot of flak. If he had moved not immediately and taken some substantial time to think